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The ICTD Government Revenue Dataset 
 
Wilson Prichard, Alex Cobham and Andrew Goodall 
 
 
Summary  
 
A major obstacle to cross-country research on the role of revenue and taxation in 
development has been the weakness of available data. This paper presents a new 
Government Revenue Dataset (GRD), developed through the International Centre for Tax 
and Development (ICTD). The dataset meticulously combines data from several major 
international databases, as well as drawing on data compiled from all available International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Article IV reports. It achieves marked improvements in data coverage 
and accuracy, including a standardised approach to revenue from natural resources, and 
holds the promise of significant improvement in the credibility and robustness of research in 
this area. This paper sets out the issues with existing sources and explains the process of 
creating the new dataset, including a discussion of remaining limitations. It then presents 
data on tax and revenue trends over the past two decades, while a concluding section briefly 
considers potential strategies for, and barriers to, more effective data collection in future. 
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Introduction 
 
The last decade has seen growing interest in taxation as a key component of sustainable 
development through its impact on economic growth and its contribution not only to 
government revenue, but also to redistribution and the emergence of improved governance 
(Cobham 2005a). This has in turn been reflected in the relatively rapid expansion of 
research, including extensive cross-country econometric research, exploring, among other 
areas: the connections between taxation, non-tax revenue and good governance (Ross 
2004; Mahon 2005; Timmons 2005; Haber and Menaldo 2011; Baskaran and Bigsten 2013); 
the impact of democracy, or of history, on taxation and the size of the state (Boix 2001; 
Cheibub 1998; Mkandawire 2010; Timmons 2010); the impact of tax reform and tax structure 
on tax revenue (Keen and Lockwood 2010; Keen and Mansour 2009; Aizenman and Jinjarak 
2009); the impact of taxation and tax structure on growth (Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo 2012; 
Adam and Bevan 2005; Lee and Gordon 2005); and the relationship between foreign 
assistance and domestic taxation (Gupta et al. 2004; Benedek et al. 2012; Clist and 
Morrissey 2011). To these questions can be added increasing recent interest in issues 
related to taxation and inequality (Gemmell and Morrissey 2005), and the scale of 
international tax evasion and avoidance (Cobham 2005b; Global Financial Integrity 2008; 
Fuest and Riedel 2009; Reuter 2012), as well as more theoretically-oriented research that 
has used global government revenue data to describe broad features of the process of 
statebuilding in developing countries (Besley and Persson 2011). 
 
Unfortunately, this rapidly expanding body of research has been accompanied by a growing 
recognition of the stark limitations of available government revenue data for developing 
countries – so much so that significant scepticism exists about even basic descriptive data 
related to global and regional tax trends over time. The most widely used global data source 
has remained the IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS). However, tellingly, many IMF 
researchers long ago abandoned reliance on this data owing to pervasive missing data and 
inconsistency in the treatment of natural resource revenue in particular (Baunsgaard and 
Keen 2005; Keen and Lockwood 2010; Keen and Mansour 2009). As researchers have 
increasingly abandoned IMF GFS data, they have instead relied on various regional datasets 
(Baskaran and Bigsten 2013),1 ad hoc datasets constructed from country-level sources 
(Haber and Menaldo 2011), or ad hoc combinations of data from multiple sources (Benedek 
et al. 2012). For the purposes of research these alternative data sources are widely viewed 
as an improvement over relying on highly incomplete data from the IMF GFS. However, the 
proliferation of alternative datasets – and poorly documented adjustments to available data – 
has made comparison and replication difficult, thus further undermining confidence in the 
quality and robustness of key results.  
 
In light of these limitations, this paper presents the newly created ICTD Government 
Revenue Dataset (GRD), which aims to overcome many of the weaknesses associated with 
existing datasets, and to provide a widely shared and comparable data source for 
researchers and policymakers. The first goal of the exercise has been to improve data 
coverage, which has been achieved by meticulously combining data from the most complete 
and reliable international sources. Among international datasets, the ICTD GRD draws 
primarily on the IMF GFS, the OECD Tax Statistics dataset and the Revenue Statistics in 
Latin America dataset constructed by the OECD, Comisión Económica para América Latina 
y el Caribe (CEPAL) and Centre Interamericano de Administraciones Tributarias (CIAT), 
while it draws to a more limited extent on data from World Development Indicators, CEPAL, 
the African Economic Outlook and a research database constructed by Keen and Mansour 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  Most notably the OECD Tax Statistics (OECD countries), CEPAL dataset (Latin American countries) and Africa 
Economic Outlook dataset (for Africa). 
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(2009). In addition, the creation of the dataset has involved compiling data in a standardised 
format from all available IMF Article IV reports. This country-level data has, in turn, been 
used to fill significant gaps in the data available from international datasets.  
 
Alongside improved data coverage, the ICTD GRD improves the accuracy of data for 
research purposes, most notably by imposing a standard approach to natural resource 
revenue. Available international sources generally do not distinguish between tax revenue 
from natural resource and non-resource sources. While this is accurate in a strict accounting 
sense, it is frequently misleading for researchers and policymakers, for whom the distinction 
between resource and non-resource revenue is critical. With this in mind, the ICTD GRD 
systematically distinguishes between resource and non-resource tax revenue, thus providing 
a clear and consistent picture of non-resource tax collection across countries – while 
providing detailed data on resource revenue wherever possible. This is achieved primarily, 
though not exclusively, by relying on more disaggregated data from IMF Article IV reports. 
Finally, additional improvements in accuracy are achieved by: systematically comparing data 
from alternative sources for every country-year, in order to remove potential errors; dealing 
systematically with social contributions; compiling data at both the central and general 
government levels; and, critically, employing a standard and up-to-date GDP series. 
 
The process of merging data from multiple international sources implies inevitable 
imperfections owing to differences in methods and the occasionally subjective nature of data 
choices. However, we contend that the benefits of this exercise dramatically outweigh the 
costs, while the transparency of our process ensures that every data choice will be open to 
scrutiny by future researchers. The end result is a dataset that achieves dramatic 
improvements in coverage and accuracy relative to existing international sources, and which 
is also substantially more complete, accurate and transparent than any other effort to 
construct a composite dataset from existing sources.2 Table A3 in the Appendix provides an 
overview of the improved data coverage offered by the ICTD dataset relative to available 
alternatives – and distinct from the still more important improvements in accuracy that it 
offers.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The first section describes the limitations of existing data 
in greater detail, and highlights some examples of their research consequences. The second 
section describes the construction and cleaning of the dataset in detail, walking the reader 
through the classification system employed, the data sources on which we draw, and the 
justification for, and approach to, merging data from multiple alternative sources. The third 
section considers the continuing, and currently inescapable, limitations of cross-country 
government revenue data. The fourth section then presents a descriptive analysis of tax and 
revenue trends over time, across tax types, income groups and regions. The final section 
concludes, with a focus on recommendations for improving the quality of government 
revenue data collection in the future.  
 
 
1  The need for a new government revenue 
dataset 
 
There are currently a number of available sources of cross-country tax and revenue data 
from organisations including the IMF, the OECD, the World Bank and CEPAL (discussed in 
greater detail below). However, these sources are frequently not consistent with one another, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  The most notable of these composite datasets is that developed by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department and employed, 
among others, by Benedek et al. (2012). 
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and each suffers problems of coverage, accuracy or both. Reflecting these problems, 
individual researchers have increasingly sought to compile their own datasets either by 
merging multiple data sources (e.g. Benedek et al. 2012), or returning to country-level 
sources (e.g. Haber and Menaldo 2011). Most tellingly, researchers from the IMF itself have 
increasingly relied on the construction of their own datasets from country-level sources, 
rather than using the organisation’s Government Finance Statistics (GFS) (Keen and 
Mansour 2009; IMF 2012). These efforts have generated data for individual studies that is 
superior for research purposes than the GFS alone. However, they have been comparatively 
ad hoc, poorly documented, not broadly available, and generally targeted towards specific 
research challenges – and thus not easily transferable across studies. What follows thus 
considers, in turn, the limitations of existing international sources, the consequences of these 
limitations for research, and alternative international efforts to improve on these existing 
options. 
 
1.1 The limitations of existing data sources 
 
Conceptually, the most important limitations of existing data sources can be usefully divided 
into five elements: (a) coverage, (b) quality and consistency, (c) reporting and comparability, 
(d) limited attention to non-central levels of government, and (e) inconsistent and inaccurate 
GDP figures. 
 
1.1.1 Coverage 	  
Existing data sources are characterised by extensive missing data and gaps in coverage. 
Some regional databases achieve significant data coverage within those regions (e.g. 
OECD, CEPAL and African Economic Outlook (AEO)). However, they are only available for 
OECD countries, Latin America and Africa, and are thus inadequate for broader international 
comparison. Moreover, data series for Latin America and Africa are limited to the period from 
1990 onwards, while both the OECD and CEPAL tax databases require information on non-
tax revenue to be retrieved from separate data series, which are sometimes either 
inconsistent or incomplete. Meanwhile, cross-country databases from the IMF and World 
Bank cover only approximately 65 per cent and 50 per cent of potential country-year 
observations for the period 1990-2010, respectively, with coverage generally declining further 
for lower-income countries and in earlier years (Table A3).3 This is particularly problematic 
because missing data is non-random, and often concentrated in countries experiencing 
instability, weak governance or a poor relationship with international organisations. 
 
1.1.2 Quality and consistency 
 
Alongside problems of coverage there are frequently substantive differences in the data 
available from different data sources. In some cases these differences appear to be driven 
by methodological choices, as unique features of individual national tax systems may lead to 
ambiguity about appropriate classification, and differences in the resulting classification 
across sources. While these differences are not ‘errors’ in any sense, they can be 
substantial. Of somewhat greater concern are a wide range of cases in which differences 
across sources are substantial and are non-systematic, as in these cases differences across 
sources are difficult to explain. An illustration of these potential challenges comes from Brazil 
in 1993, as tax revenue figures (exclusive of social security) vary substantially from source to 
source: BRL 1,115 million in the IMF Article IV Report, BRL 1,480 million in the GFS dataset, 
BRL 1,765 million in the CEPAL dataset and BRL 1,825 million in the OECD dataset. Tax 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  While many of the datasets cover earlier periods as well – and these earlier periods are included in the ICTD GRD – we 
focus on the period 1990-2010 for illustration because this is the period over which all of the data sources are available, 
and thus amenable to illustrative comparison. 
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data from Argentina in 2002 follows a similar pattern: ARS 32,100 million in the IMF Article IV 
report, ARS 23,327 million from the IMF GFS Budgetary Central Government dataset, ARS 
30,092 million from the IMF Consolidated Central Government dataset, and  
ARS 28,045 million in the CEPAL and OECD datasets.4  
 
In these cases there may be no simple answer to the question of which source is 
unambiguously correct or preferable. Depending on one’s perspective, these differences are 
suggestive both of the dangers inherent in merging data from different sources (and the need 
to ensure in any individual case that merged data ‘matches’), and of the importance of 
comparing different data sources in order to identify unusually divergent data within any 
individual source. In most cases, in the absence of a clear ‘right’ answer, a pragmatic 
response is to focus on consistency (at least within countries) and to create transparency 
across sources about these differences. One of the goals of the new ICTD dataset is 
correspondingly to make these differences across sources more visible, by allowing for easy 
comparison of data points from different sources. 
 
1.1.3 Reporting and comparability 
 
While comparing different data sources thus reveals substantive, and often difficult to 
explain, differences in individual data points, these differences tend to be relatively modest. 
By contrast, more dramatic problems with available data – and with efforts to merge data 
from multiple sources – can be traced to deeper methodological challenges and differences 
across sources.  
 
The most important and challenging issues arise in relation to the treatment of natural 
resource revenue. Both countries and sources vary dramatically in whether revenue from the 
natural resource sector is recorded as tax or non-tax revenue, and it is almost always 
impossible in international databases to distinguish between the resource and non-resource 
components of different revenue categories. The consequences for research and policy are 
significant: without distinguishing between resource and non-resource sources of revenue it 
is impossible to understand the extent to which a government is extracting tax revenue from 
its own citizens, to understand the composition of government revenue in a meaningful way, 
or to assess potential threats to fiscal balance.  
 
The case of Iran provides perhaps the most striking illustration of the depth of this problem. 
Pre-1990 IMF GFS data (based on the 1986 GFS Manual (IMF 1986)) saw resource revenue 
classified as tax revenue, while post-1990 IMF GFS data saw tax revenue reported exclusive 
of resource revenue. This results in a major break in the data series. Similarly, in Ecuador 
the IMF GFS records tax revenue 75 per cent higher than the CEPAL dataset owing to 
different choices about the inclusion or exclusion of resource revenue in tax revenue. In 
Angola, adherence to the IMF GFS or the AEO fiscal indicators yields tax collection figures 
over the past two decades ranging from 30-50 per cent of GDP, whereas non-resource tax 
collection – which is the more analytically useful category in most cases – amounts to less 
than 10 per cent of GDP in all years, and less than 5 per cent in some. The range of such 
cases in existing data is extensive, and in many cases makes cross-country analysis 
fundamentally misleading. 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  A more extreme example comes from the IMF GFS data for Iran, which indicates total government revenue that 
exceeds 100% of GDP from 1987-1989 when combined with GDP data from the International Finance Statistics. In 
slightly different fashion, there is massive volatility in data for countries of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. 
For a variety of other cases official data suggests implausibly high levels of revenue collection, or marked swings in 
revenue collection from year to year, with this often related to a disjuncture between official revenue figures and official 
GDP figures, as discussed below.  
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In general, countries record corporate taxes paid by private sector resource companies as 
taxes, while recording royalties, export taxes, profit sharing and the profits of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs) as non-tax revenue. However, this pattern is not strictly adhered to 
across sources, and is often not consistent over time within IMF Article IV reports. 
Irrespective of the specific reasons for these differences in allocation, they can make 
available data virtually meaningless for analytical purposes – it obscures the actual level of 
extraction from citizens, it makes meaningful comparison involving resource-rich countries 
impossible, and it distorts trends over time. As it stands, some resource-rich countries 
appear to be among the most successful tax collectors globally, while others appear to 
collect very limited tax revenue – and this varies across sources. Meanwhile, increases or 
decreases in taxes may reflect shifts in the fiscal framework for resource revenue, or the 
reallocation of revenue between the tax and non-tax categories, rather than changes in the 
extractive capacity of states.  
 
The treatment of social contributions is more straightforward, but still critical: both countries 
and data sources vary in whether social contributions are included in revenue statistics at all, 
and, in turn, whether they are classified as tax revenue, direct tax revenue, or neither of the 
two. With social contributions amounting to as much as 20 per cent of government revenue 
in some cases, these classification choices can have a huge implication for interpreting the 
extractive capacity of states – and can lead to major inconsistencies in seeking to draw 
comparisons across countries, or even within countries over time. This is generally not a 
problem within individual data sources, but is an important (and often overlooked) issue 
when combining or comparing data from multiple sources. Thus, for example, when merging 
IMF GFS data from the pre-1990 and post-1990 periods, social contributions are included in 
tax revenue in the earlier period, but not in the latter. Similarly, IMF Article IV reports are 
inconsistent in their recording choices, thus necessitating care in drawing on data from 
different reports.  
 
1.1.4 Levels of government 
 
While the issues above have been increasingly widely acknowledged, a more often 
overlooked issue relates to researchers’ frequent reliance on central government data for the 
purpose of analysis. The motivation for this focus is straightforward: central government data 
is more widely available, whereas general government data is most often not available for 
lower-income countries owing to the absence of data from local government. However, while 
pragmatic, a focus on central government data can be misleading for federal states, where 
large shares of government revenue are collected at the state/provincial and local levels. A 
focus on central government revenue vastly understates revenue collection in states like 
India, Brazil and Nigeria, while it can also obscure trends in revenue over time if revenue 
assignment across levels of government changes. So, for example, in Brazil central 
government tax revenue hovered at around 15 per cent of GDP during the 2000s, which 
would place it among the lowest tax collectors in South America, whereas general 
government data reveals total tax collection around 25 per cent of GDP, which is among the 
highest in the region and more indicative of the reality in the country.  
 
1.1.5 GDP series 
 
While there are thus significant challenges with available revenue data itself, additional 
inaccuracy and incompatibility is frequently introduced by differences in the GDP series 
employed to calculate tax ratios. Modest problems can arise from small but frequent 
differences in GDP series across sources. These differences highlight the need for any 
analysis to pay explicit attention to the GDP series being employed – something which is 
frequently not the case. It equally suggests that when data is merged from multiple sources a 
constant GDP series should be applied – lest ‘jumps’ in the data result from differences in 
GDP series across sources. Meanwhile, much larger and more troubling problems can arise 
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from the irregular rebasing of GDP, which can drive major overestimation of tax-to-GDP 
figures as well as abrupt breaks in the data series being employed.  
 
Base year data is used to establish the share of different activities (e.g. agriculture and 
manufacturing) in a country’s total GDP. Current data on growth in each sector is then 
combined with this information on shares to create GDP series. Rebasing has major 
implications in economies where the share of different activities has changed substantially 
over time (say, for example, manufacturing has grown rapidly at the expense of agriculture). 
Major readjustments of GDP estimates – potentially as large as 50 per cent – are therefore 
possible. Thus, for example, rebasing in Ghana in 2010 resulted in a 60 per cent ‘increase’ in 
GDP, while rebasing in 2014 in Zambia and Nigeria has resulted in increases of 25 per cent 
and 90 per cent, respectively.5 The importance of frequent rebasing (at, e.g., 5-year 
intervals) to avoid major distortions is widely acknowledged, but may not be prioritised when 
– as is often the case – statistical resources are tightly constrained.  
 
By driving the underestimation of actual GDP, infrequent GDP rebasing can result in 
significantly inflated tax-to-GDP ratios. This alone implies a need for caution in conducting 
research using cross-country data, and the need for care in comparing reported levels of tax 
collection across countries, regions or income groupings. However, while the 
underestimation of GDP is thus a major consideration on its own, the problem is magnified 
by the fact that international sources sometimes use GDP series for the same country with 
different base years (Jerven 2013a). Inconsistency in GDP series results in rapid shifts in 
tax-to-GDP ratios at points of discontinuity in underlying GDP series – even in those 
situations where the underlying tax data is consistent.  
 
This was, for example, the case in Ghana, where the reported tax-to-GDP ratio exceeded 20 
per cent, before rebasing in 2010 saw a large upward adjustment in GDP – and a 
corresponding fall in the reported tax ratio to less than 13 per cent of GDP. Critically, this 
discontinuity persists within some international datasets: within the IMF International 
Financial Statistics (IFS), the 2010 rebasing exercise is only reflected in GDP data from 2006 
onwards, thus resulting in a dramatic break in the GDP series after 2005 – and a 
subsequently dramatic fall in the reported tax-to-GDP ratio when employing IFS GDP data. A 
more dramatic, and difficult to understand, illustration comes from Iran. When tax and 
revenue data for the IMF GFS is paired with the IMF IFS GDP series, the result is an 
apparent increase in total government revenue from 26 per cent of GDP in 1982 to 119 per 
cent of GDP in 1989. In both cases these risks to research are not merely abstract: these 
specific data errors appear in the data employed for recent and high profile research which 
draws on an internal IMF database (Benedek et al. 2012). 
 
1.2 Consequences for research 
 
The impact on research of the absence of high quality data is reflected in inescapable, and 
serious, concerns about results that rely on existing sources, as well as the proliferation of 
competing research outputs each relying on its own, frequently ad hoc, dataset. This latter 
problem is little talked about, but very significant: as many existing results are not 
comparable, data cannot be interrogated effectively and it is in some cases difficult or 
impossible to replicate existing results. While the introduction of new regional datasets for 
Africa and Latin America in recent years has improved data quality for some subsets of 
countries, it has not addressed problems relating to the inconsistent treatment of resource 
revenue, and has exacerbated the problem of different researchers employing different data, 
thus producing non-comparable results. To briefly illustrate the nature and extent of these 
concerns, it is useful to consider two research areas that have been the subject of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  Jerven (2013a); Cobham (2014); Mukanga (2014); Leo (2014).  
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preliminary ICTD research using the ICTD GRD: (a) the connections between foreign aid and 
tax effort, and (b) the connections between taxation, non-tax revenue and accountability. 
 
1.2.1 Foreign aid and tax effort 
 
Researchers have long asked whether large flows of foreign aid might reduce the incentive 
for recipient countries to collect domestic tax revenue, in much the same way as access to 
natural resource wealth. This is, moreover, a seemingly straightforward proposition to test 
econometrically, at least in its simplest form: empirically, do countries actually collect less tax 
revenue when they receive more aid?  
 
In practice this has become a highly contentious research question, and an important part of 
that tension has been driven by imperfect data, inconsistent data choices, and a lack of 
comparability across studies. The most widely cited study is that of Gupta et al. (2004), who 
reported evidence that aid grants have a statistically significant negative impact on domestic 
tax collection, while loans do not have the same negative impact. This finding was 
subsequently replicated by Benedek et al. (2012), drawing on an internal dataset employing 
a combination of IMF data (from multiple sources) and OECD data. These findings have 
significant policy implications, as they represent an important argument against the provision 
of grants to low-income countries. However, research by Clist and Morrissey (2011) and 
Carter (2013) has called that research finding into question, based on the application of other 
publicly available data, more sophisticated methods, and an acknowledgement that the 
relationship may have shifted over time.  
 
This debate reflects differences in methodological approach, but has also reflected 
differences in data. Carter (2013) is forced to consider all his results separately for multiple 
alternative datasets, reflecting the relative lack of easy comparability across studies. This 
included the datasets employed by Gupta et al. (2004) and Benedek et al. (2012), neither of 
which is publicly available, though in both cases the authors were willing to share the data 
privately. In a more recent contribution, Clist (2014) attempted to replicate the results 
reported in Benedek et al. (2012), and uncovered major concerns about the accuracy of the 
dataset underlying the results (discussed in more detail below). He, in turn, discovered that 
the results were not robust to using alternative data or alternative methods. Morrissey et al. 
(2014) have subsequently employed the new ICTD GRD to test the relationship between aid 
and tax effort, and similarly find that there is no significant relationship.  
 
Ultimately, this literature has seen the application of increasingly sophisticated econometric 
models, amidst continuing disagreement about results. However, in practice the major threat 
to the credibility of earlier results has lain not in the weakness of the econometric 
approaches, but in the inconsistency of the underlying data on which these studies have 
been based. The work of Morrissey et al. (2014), drawing on the ICTD GRD, thus represents 
an opportunity to overcome this impasse.  
 
1.2.2 Taxation, non-tax revenue and accountability 
 
Burgeoning research into the political ‘resource curse’ – which posits a negative relationship 
between reliance on resource revenue and political accountability – offers a similar 
illustration of existing data challenges. Ultimately, the most important theories of the resource 
curse are ultimately about government revenue, as governments with greater revenue from 
natural resources are expected to be less accountable to their citizens. However, owing at 
least in part to the weakness of cross-country revenue data, most existing studies have relied 
instead on more readily measures of the value of resource production to test the relationship 
(e.g. Ross 2001; Aslaksen 2010; Haber and Menaldo 2011). Put simply, the limitations of 
cross-country government revenue data have undermined the ability of researchers to test 
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the causal relationship of interest precisely, while contributing to continuing controversy 
about the existence, or not, of a resource curse. 
 
Meanwhile, a handful of studies have sought to employ government revenue data – but the 
quality of the results is called into question by the low quality of that data. Ross (2004) 
offered the first major cross-country econometric test of the relationship between the 
composition of government revenue and democracy, and reported highly influential evidence 
of a positive relationship between tax reliance and accountability. However, his dataset – 
drawn from the IMF GFS and World Bank World Development Indicators – captured only 
about half of possible observations for developing countries, while it failed to account 
consistently for the inclusion of resource revenue in reported tax revenue. Timmons (2005) 
provided additional results supportive of the idea of ‘fiscal contracts’, but again relied on 
highly incomplete data from the IMF and World Bank. Morrison (2009) subsequently reported 
a different set of conclusions, arguing that greater access to non-tax revenue does not 
reduce democracy, but simply increases the stability of both democracies and autocracies 
alike. However, he similarly relied on data from the IMF GFS, thus calling the reliability of the 
results into question. 
 
Recognising the weaknesses of available data, Haber and Menaldo (2011) followed an 
alternative strategy, pursuing an ambitious effort to gather more complete data from country-
level sources. However, they collected government revenue data for only a subset of 
eighteen resource-rich countries, thus limiting the completeness of their results. Meanwhile, 
their reliance on country-level sources – while impressive – implies inescapable concerns 
about the possibility of different methodologies across countries, and about the barriers to 
other researchers expanding upon their dataset.6 In a separate study, Baskaran and Bigsten 
(2013) have published tests linking taxation and accountability by drawing on the new AEO 
African Fiscal Performance. However, while the AEO database provides relatively complete 
data, it raises a variety of limitations: there is no scope for comparison with other regions, it 
covers a comparatively brief time horizon, and offers limited comparability to other studies 
owing to differences in data across sources.  
 
Again, the bottom line is that inconsistent and imperfect data has sharply limited the 
persuasiveness and completeness of existing results. In an effort to address these 
uncertainties, Prichard et al. (2014) have employed the ICTD GRD to provide the first tests of 
the connection between tax revenue, non-tax revenue and democracy using relatively 
complete and reliable data across countries. They find significant support for the contention 
that states that are more reliant on non-tax revenue, primarily from natural resources, are 
less like to be democratic – while finding no evidence that non-tax revenue has the stabilising 
effect suggested by Morrison (2009). Not only are these findings more robust than those of 
earlier studies, but they are also easily replicable owing to the public availability of the data.  
 
1.3 Alternative international efforts 
 
The problems discussed here are widely recognised, and the status quo for research is 
widely viewed as inadequate, but there has been limited progress. Serious discussions within 
the IMF about improving data quality appear to date back a decade or more, but actual 
progress has been very slow. Interviews with those involved suggest that this has reflected, 
among other factors, limited resources, poor cooperation between different divisions within 
the organisation, and, potentially, a reluctance to acknowledge the limitations of existing data 
publicly. To this can be added the different incentives and interests of the statistics 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6  To their great credit, Haber and Menaldo have been extremely forthcoming in making their data available to other 
researchers. However, because of reliance on country-level sources, and unique methodologies across countries, it is 
very difficult for other researchers to return to original source materials, or to build upon the dataset. 
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departments that collect data and those who use it for policy and research. The former tend 
to focus more heavily on the finer details of data quality, while approaching categorisation 
from primarily an accounting perspective. Meanwhile, the latter (including the initiative 
described here) are generally more interested in ‘good enough’ data, and on data structures 
that capture key analytical distinctions (as with the distinction between resource and non-
resource revenue). Again there are no strictly right answers, but, ideally, a need for flexible 
approaches that can accommodate both sets of considerations. 
 
This is not, however, to suggest the total absence of progress in improving data quality. 
Within the IMF, efforts have been ongoing within the Statistics Department to review and 
improve the quality of the IMF GFS data to the extent possible. More ambitiously, a template 
has been developed to allow for much more systematic collection of data on natural resource 
revenue, with a view to drawing consistent distinctions between the resource and non-
resource components of key revenue categories. Meanwhile the Fiscal Affairs Department 
has pursued an initiative, similar to the dataset described here, to merge data from multiple 
different sources (IMF GFS, World Economic Outlook, OECD and Article IV reports) in order 
to improve data coverage.  
 
These initiatives are all very welcome, but are not a substitute for the ICTD GRD. Efforts to 
improve the IMF GFS, and particularly to collect data on natural resource revenue 
systematically, are extremely valuable – but it appears likely to be at least a decade until that 
work yields a sufficiently long time series for many types of analysis. Meanwhile, the 
composite dataset that has been developed internally by the Fiscal Affairs Department, and 
used in recent research, is less ambitious than the ICTD GRD. It does not systematically 
account for resource revenue or for inconsistent GDP series, nor has it involved the same 
level of manual cleaning of the merged data (described below). As a result it continues to 
suffer from important conceptual problems and inaccuracies, as reflected most notably in 
Clist (2014). 
 
The OECD has also begun to move beyond its traditional focus on OECD countries in order 
to gather government revenue data for non-OECD states. The first such initiative was a 
partnership with CEPAL to construct the Revenue Statistics in Latin America database; this 
draws to a significant extent on existing CEPAL data but re-classifies it according to the 
OECD classification system – which is slightly distinct from, though compatible with, the IMF 
system of classification. The OECD, through the AEO, has also supported the collection of 
tax data across all African countries, though the scope of that data is more limited. More 
recently it has initiated more ambitious efforts to collect more detailed and systematic data 
from developing countries, following the OECD system of classification (Pierre 2013). 
However, while these initiatives point towards a very welcome OECD interest in improving 
the quality of official data, there remain challenges: these are long-term projects with 
uncertain prospects for markedly improving data quality7 or of achieving global coverage, 
while there are obvious concerns about a lack of coordination between the OECD and IMF. 
 
Initiatives by the IMF and OECD to collect higher quality and more complete government 
revenue data unquestionably offer the greatest prospect for a long-term improvement in data 
quality. As importantly, meaningful progress has been made, and appears to be accelerating. 
However, these are long-term projects with still uncertain prospects, and in the interim 
research and policymaking would have had to continue to rely on an inadequate foundation. 
Against this background the ICTD GRD achieves an unambiguous and immediate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  The OECD initiative aims to collect high quality data following a standardised OECD classification; such high quality and 
standardised data is in principle highly desirable. However, there remain questions about whether national governments 
with often weak statistical departments will be able to provide sufficiently high quality historical data – and thus about 
whether the historical data collected by the OECD will necessarily be of higher quality than what already exists, or what 
can be achieved by carefully drawing on multiple existing sources. 
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improvement in the quality of available historical data, while it has the potential to offer 
insights into future needs and to act as a potential catalyst for more rapid progress. 
 
 
2  Construction of the dataset 
 
Against this background, the construction of the ICTD GRD has been based on the careful 
compilation, merging and cleaning of data from multiple existing data sources, in order to 
arrive at a markedly more complete and accurate dataset. The potential of such a strategy is 
illustrated in Figure 1, which presents overlapping data coverage from different sources (but 
also data differences) for Ghana from 1990 to 2010. The graph illustrates both the potential 
for merging datasets in order to close gaps in the data, and the extent to which data varies 
across sources – with the largest discrepancies arising from differences in underlying GDP 
series.8  
 
The effort undertaken in creating the ICTD GRD mirrors to some extent the construction of 
the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department dataset employed by Benedek et al. (2012), but exceeds 
that effort in several important ways.9 First, we draw more extensively on data from IMF 
Article IV reports in order to fill gaps in other international datasets. Second, we use those 
same sources in order to be able to deal systematically with natural resource revenue, thus 
making the data more accurate, consistent and analytically meaningful. Third, we rely on a 
common GDP series throughout, thus smoothing potential discontinuities in the data. And, 
finally, we pursue much more detailed manual cleaning of the data, in order to ensure 
compatibility across sources and the overall accuracy of the data.  
 
Figure 1 Alternative data sources for Ghana 1990-2010 
 
Notes: Authors’ calculations. GFS denotes IMF Government Finance Statistics, coupled with the IMF WEO GDP series. IMF CR 
denotes IMF Country Reports, encompassing IMF Article IV reports and statistical appendices, and based on GDP figures 
contained in those reports. AEO denotes the African Economic Outlook dataset, which reports figures as shares of GDP, though 
with some ambiguity about the source of underlying GDP figures. WB WDI denotes the World Bank World Development 
Indicators, combined with the GDP series from the same source. K & M denotes the dataset developed by Keen and Mansour 
(2009), coupled with the WEO GDP series. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8  Note, in this figure the IMF GFS figures are based on the application of the IMF World Economic Outlook (WEO) GDP 
series. Application of the IMG IFS GDP series would cause GFS data to more closely resemble data from IMF Country 
Reports (IMF CR). 
9  Indicative of the limitations of this (and other) earlier efforts, Carter (2013) draws on data from this internal dataset 
developed by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department but notes several problems within that data, led by a major change in 
data classification for Iran before and after 1990. Clist (2014) assesses the composite data employed by Benedek et al. 
(2012), and similarly finds major jumps and inconsistencies in the data revolving around the combining of multiple data 
sources.  
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More formally, the construction of the dataset has involved six broad stages. First, the 
development of a standard classification scheme that can accommodate data from multiple 
different sources, while capturing critical new information about the extent of natural resource 
revenue. Second, a survey of existing cross-country datasets, led by those compiled by the 
IMF, OECD and CEPAL. Third, the systematic compilation of data from IMF Article IV 
reports, which makes it possible to fill gaps in international datasets and, most critically, to 
disaggregate the resource components of reported tax and non-tax revenue. Fourth, the 
adoption of a common GDP series, in order to eliminate discontinuities or errors arising from 
problems with the GDP series underlying some existing international sources. Fifth, the 
careful merging of data from these alternative sources into a single dataset. While the initial 
goal had been to automate this latter task, in practice ensuring data accuracy has required 
the careful manual cleaning of the data, coupled with careful documentation of the choices 
made. And, finally, developing a composite dataset that draws on both central and general 
government data as appropriate in order to provide the most accurate possible picture of 
national revenue collection. 
 
2.1 Developing a standardised revenue classification 
 
There are modest, though important, differences in the tax and revenue categories reported 
by different sources and, at times, in how revenue is categorised. The latter is an issue to be 
addressed through greater coordination among international organisations, but is beyond the 
scope of this project. That said, it does highlight the importance of caution when data from 
different sources is merged, as sources may differ in how they categorise the sub-
components of tax revenue, even where they agree on the aggregate level of tax collection. 
The more important goal here has been to arrive at a revenue classification that takes fullest 
advantage of data from different sources, and which also maximises consistency across 
those sources in the categorisation of revenue.  
 
In doing so, an important starting point is an acceptance that, for low-income countries in 
particular, the quality of government data is sufficiently limited, and difficulties of consistent 
classification sufficiently significant, that highly disaggregated data is not a realistic goal. This 
is reflected, for example, in the fact that most countries continue to report data to the IMF on 
a cash and budgetary basis, despite a formal shift in the IMF 2001 Government Finance 
Statistics Manual towards reporting on an accrual basis. The goal is thus not to have perfect 
data, but to have good enough data for analysis – by which we mean that it is generally 
consistent over time, free of obvious discontinuities, and that the classification of revenue to 
different sub-components of taxation is consistent at least at a relatively high level of 
aggregation. 
 
With these constraints in mind, the foundation for the ICTD dataset is a classification system 
that closely mirrors the primary revenue categories collected by the IMF, but which adds two 
additional composite categories: direct taxes and indirect taxes. These additional categories 
are useful in that they are relatively easily constructed from available data (Figure 2), but by 
virtue of their high level of aggregation can overcome occasional differences across sources 
in the allocation of revenue between the sub-components of direct and indirect taxes, which 
can make these more aggregated categories more consistent and complete over time and 
across sources.10  
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10  This is most apparent when attempting to classify data from IMF Article IV reports consistently over time, while it is also 
reflected in the fact that the sub-components of tax revenue often do not perfectly add up owing to the difficulty of 
classifying some types of revenue. 
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Figure 2 Basic revenue classification scheme for ICTD GRD 
 
 
However, while these relatively common revenue categories provide the foundation for our 
classification, they fail to provide a standard format across sources for the classification of 
natural resource revenue and social contributions. In response, the primary innovation of our 
classification scheme is to report relevant revenue categories inclusive and exclusive of 
natural resource revenue and social contributions. With respect to resource revenue, this 
means that wherever a tax figure includes a resource component, that resource component 
of tax revenue is explicitly separated out in order to yield three distinct variables: total tax 
revenue, the resource component of tax revenue, and the non-resource component of tax 
revenue. Because resource revenue is frequently included not only in aggregate tax revenue, 
but in taxes on corporations, taxes on income, profits and capital gains, direct taxes and 
indirect taxes, each of those revenue categories is similarly divided into its resource and non-
resource components.11 In the same vein, wherever possible non-tax revenue is divided into 
its resource and non-resource components. This further disaggregation is depicted in Figure 
3. 
 
  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11  There are a few cases in which resource revenue is recorded in other revenue categories – most commonly trade taxes 
or taxes on goods and services. Because these cases are very rare we have not constructed a distinct set of categories 
to capture the resource and non-resource components of revenue in these categories independently. Instead, where 
possible we have excluded the resource component of, for example, trade taxes, and reclassified that revenue as the 
resource component of non-tax revenue. In the few cases where this has not been possible we have included a flag in 
the dataset to indicate that the sub-components of indirect tax revenue are ‘contaminated’ by resource revenue. 
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Figure 3 Expanded revenue classification scheme for ICTD GRD 
 
 
With respect to social contributions, the 2001 IMF classification system treats social 
contributions as a separate category, distinct from tax revenue. However, other sources 
frequently treat social contributions as tax revenue, and as a component of direct taxes. 
Meanwhile, in Article IV reports in particular some countries do not report social contributions 
as a component of government revenue at all, instead reporting them entirely separately or 
not at all. Rather than simply removing social contributions from these tax categories, which 
would potentially obscure the relationship between underlying sources and the final dataset, 
we instead opt to present total government revenue, total tax revenue and total direct tax 
revenue inclusive and exclusive of social contributions in the core dataset. That said, the 
revenue categories that are exclusive of social contributions are most complete across 
countries, given inconsistent reporting of social contributions. 
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2.2 Surveying available datasets 
 
Having arrived at a core system of classification, the starting point for the construction of the 
dataset itself has been a survey of available international sources, and their compilation 
according to our common classification. Ultimately, the ICTD GRD has drawn on six cross-
country datasets provided by leading international organisations: IMF Government Finance 
Statistics (GFS), World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI), OECD Tax Statistics, 
OECD Revenue Statistics in Latin America dataset, CEPAL Tax Statistics, and the AEO 
African Fiscal Performance.12 The IMF GFS database underwent a change in methodology 
post-1990, and pre- and post-1990 data was gathered and incorporated into the dataset 
separately in order to ensure consistency.13  
 
In addition, three datasets developed by researchers have been included in the survey of 
possible sources: Keen and Mansour (2009), which is based on IMF Article IV reports, the 
Michigan Ross School of Business World Tax Database (WTD) and the Oxford Latin 
America Economic History Database (OxLAD). For the most part these latter datasets have 
not been included in the final version of the ICTD GRD, as they are superseded by the 
standard international sources and/or country-level data collected directly from IMF Article IV 
reports (discussed below). The most interesting is the Keen and Mansour dataset, which 
occasionally contains figures that we have been unable to obtain from publicly available 
Article IV reports. This extra data makes it potentially very valuable, but because it does not 
cover all revenue categories, and includes a unique categorisation of trade taxes, it is in 
practice relatively difficult to incorporate. Figure 4 provides an indication of the ways in which 
the different data sources are connected. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12  The most notable exclusion from this list is the World Economic Outlook (WEO) dataset, which provides total tax figures 
but does not include more disaggregated revenue data. 
13  There are differences, most notably across the pre- and post-1990 data in the recording of social contributions and 
natural resource revenue. 
	   21 
Figure 4 Sources for revenue data 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: CEPAL gives a partial account of its sources when they are national statistics offices; its sources otherwise are not 
indicated (but may be WEO and/or GFS). The source for Michigan Ross WTD is not indicated but clearly derives from GFS. For 
OxLAD the source is identified as GFS/IFS for 1970 onwards. 
 
2.3 Drawing data from IMF Article IV reports 
 
While existing international databases provide a useful starting point they are limited by still 
extensive missing data, particularly in those regions not covered by regional datasets, and, 
most acutely, their inability for the most part to deal adequately with natural resource 
revenue. As such, the most ambitious aspect of the project has been the systematic 
compilation of data extracted from IMF Article IV reports and statistical appendices. This 
effort builds on existing trends, as a growing number of researchers – beginning with Keen 
and Mansour (2009) – have turned to country-level sources in order to fill gaps in the data 
provided by international datasets. However, previous efforts in this direction have been 
region-specific and somewhat ad hoc, with researchers compiling a limited set of variables 
relevant to specific research projects. By contrast, we have extracted revenue data across 
our entire range of variables from every publicly available IMF Article IV report or statistical 
appendix.14 
 
The primary benefits of Article IV data, relative to existing international sources, are twofold. 
First, IMF Article IV reports provide more complete data coverage, particularly for low-income 
countries, and thus serve to fill a number of gaps in existing international data sources. 
Figure 5 provides an illustration from Albania of the additional data coverage provided by 
Article IV data. Second, IMF Article IV reports are the only consistent source of data that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14  Note that while data from IMF Article IV reports has been compiled into a single dataset, it is not itself suitable for 
econometric analysis in its raw form owing to significant discontinuities over time in the way that revenue is reported for 
certain countries, and cases in which it is not possible to exclude resource revenue. While we have made every effort to 
ensure consistency over time in revenue classification, it is sometimes not possible owing to the nature of available 
data. Where IMF Article IV report data has been included in the final ICTD GRD, these inconsistencies have, of course, 
been accounted for, often through the exclusion of problematic sub-components of tax revenue. By contrast, in the free-
standing dataset we have retained most available information, while simply flagging periods in which there are 
inconsistencies in the revenue classification. 
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disaggregates the resource and non-resource components of tax revenue, thus providing the 
basis to overcome major inconsistencies in the reporting of natural resource revenue in the 
GFS in particular. As a result, Article IV data becomes the primary source of data for 
resource-rich states, for which existing data sources are particularly inadequate.  
 
Figure 5 Additional data coverage using Article IV data: Albania 1992-2009 
 
Notes:  Data compiled by the authors.  GG denotes General Government data, CG denotes Central Government data and SS 
denotes social contributions. 
 
While these advantages are substantial, it remains important to acknowledge the dangers 
and challenges that arise from relying on Article IV data. Most basically, Article IV data may 
not be as methodologically precise as GFS data from an accounting perspective, while it may 
also not be cleaned and verified as carefully. Insofar as these issues remain marginal they 
are a small price to pay for improved data coverage – again, the goal here is not perfect 
data, but good enough data. However, there remains a need to exercise some judgement 
where figures appear implausible, or are simply inconsistent with other sources.  
 
Concerns about data quality aside, significant care has also been required in coding Article 
IV data into a standard classification scheme. At a broad level the data contained in Article IV 
reports generally follows the IMF 1986 classification scheme, but it is presented in highly 
varied formats which often also vary over time within individual countries. Article IV reports 
frequently adhere to the tax categories used nationally, requiring occasionally subjective 
decisions about how to group different tax types into our standard classification. It has thus 
been necessary to ensure that classification decisions yield aggregate revenue categories 
that are consistent both with other international sources, and within countries over time.15   
 
Finally, while IMF Article IV reports offer the best available source of data on resource 
revenue, this does not imply perfection. Defining what constitutes resource revenue is 
inherently complex: beyond royalties, retained profits of state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15  Details about categorisation choices for each country are available in the underlying dataset in which Article IV data has 
been compiled. 
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profit sharing, should this category, for example, include only corporate taxes paid by 
resource firms, or also some combination of income taxes paid by employees of those firms, 
sales taxes paid by those firms, or customs duties? While IMF Article IV reports appear 
generally to focus on corporate taxes, this is not necessarily universal or perfectly consistent. 
While we do not feel that this calls any of the data significantly into question – and this data is 
undoubtedly better than available alternatives – it does speak to significant scope for further 
improvement in the raw data available from international sources.  
 
2.4 Standardising the underlying GDP series 
 
Having compiled data into a common format, the final step in ensuring comparability across 
sources and over time has been the adoption of a common GDP series. Because 
researchers are ultimately interested in government revenue expressed as a share of GDP, 
data errors and inconsistency can arise from both the revenue data itself and from national 
GDP figures. This is a particularly important problem when comparing data from multiple 
international sources, as they frequently draw on distinct GDP series, thus resulting in 
divergent tax-to-GDP ratios. As discussed earlier, this problem is most acute in countries that 
have rebased their GDP calculations, as these rebasing exercises can result in very large 
adjustments to nominal GDP, while these methodological changes are frequently not applied 
retroactively to earlier years.16 In these cases the tax-to-GDP ratio can experience very large 
year-to-year changes driven by changes in the underlying GDP series.  
 
In order to eliminate these problems we have recorded all revenue data in local currency 
units (LCU), while employing the WEO GDP series across all data sources. The WEO GDP 
series is attractive because it is most systematic in updating historical data in response to 
GDP rebasing. However, the WEO GDP series occasionally has missing data where GDP is 
nonetheless available from other sources, while it does not reach back prior to 1980. We 
have thus employed alternative GDP series for missing years if, and only if, the alternative 
GDP series (most often the IMF IFS) closely matches the WEO GDP series in overlapping 
and nearby years.17 The increased alignment between data sources that results from a 
standardised GDP series is illustrated in Figure 6, which presents data for Ghana when 
employing source-specific GDP figures versus the common GDP series. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16  This is most notably true for the IMF International Financial Statistics dataset, and for individual IMF Article IV reports. 
17  More specifically, when adding GDP series prior to 1980, IFS (or other) data is adopted if, and only if, the alternative 
series matched the WEO series +/- 5% in 1980. These parameters can, in principle, be adjusted by users should they 
wish to do so in order to introduce more restrictive or permissive conditions. 
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Figure 6 Source-specific GDP vs. common GDP series: Ghana 1990-2010 
 
 
 
Beyond these general rules, the challenges associated with inconsistent GDP series over 
time have necessitated particular care in relation to IMF Article IV reports for two reasons. 
First, IMF Article IV reports frequently, particularly in earlier years, report revenue figures 
only as a percentage of GDP. In converting these figures to LCU it has been necessary to 
convert using the GDP figures employed within the same Article IV report, while then 
reconverting to tax-to-GDP ratios using the common GDP series. Second, in cases where 
countries have adopted new currencies over time, IMF Article IV reports contain revenue 
data in currency units that differ from the currency units employed by the WEO GDP series. 
In these cases it is necessary either to convert Article IV data to the new currency, or to 
employ the GDP figures contained in Article IV reports, so that the currency units match. 
Which solution is adopted has depended on the plausibility and fit of each solution, with the 
latter solution only applicable where the GDP figures contained in the IMF Article IV report in 
question are consistent (though in different currency units) with those in the common GDP 
series. 
 
  
0.0% 
5.0% 
10.0% 
15.0% 
20.0% 
25.0% 
1980 1984 1988 1992 1996 2000 2004 2008 
Year 
Ghana: Total tax as % source-specific GDP 
K & M 
GFS 
IMF CR 
WB WDI 
0.0% 
2.0% 
4.0% 
6.0% 
8.0% 
10.0% 
12.0% 
14.0% 
16.0% 
1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 2001 2004 2007 2010 Year 
Ghana: Total tax as % common GDP series 
K & M 
GFS 
IMF CR 
WB WDI 
	   25 
2.5 Data merging and creation of the ‘first choice’ dataset 
 
Having established a common revenue classification, compiled systematic data from IMF 
country reports, and selected a common GDP series, the next stage was to merge data from 
multiple international sources in order to create a best possible international researchers’ 
dataset. To do so, the first step was the creation of a single ‘collated’ dataset, allowing for the 
comparison of data from all different sources for any country-year observation. This dataset, 
which is available upon request, has been constructed in order to create transparency about 
alternative data for any individual country-year, and subsequent choices about the inclusion 
or exclusion of particular data from the final dataset. 
 
With the collated dataset thus created, the next stage was the actual merging of data. In 
order to maximise the objectivity of this process, initial data merging was based on a 
common formula for selecting the best possible data source for each country-year. Following 
experimentation the initial merging formula was based on four factors: (a) the level of 
disaggregation of the data (more is better); (b) the length and completeness of the time 
series; (c) the level of overlap and consistency when combining multiple sources for a single 
country; and (d) a ranking of data sources, with IMF Article IV and GFS data given priority 
with the exception of OECD countries, where OECD data was given priority.  
 
Unfortunately, data merging based on a standard algorithm proved relatively problematic. In 
general, formula-based merging of data works well if the data sources are generally 
equivalent, but with different periods of data coverage. By contrast, government revenue 
data frequently varies significantly across sources, be it due to a different classification 
system, different inclusions and exclusions, problems dealing with natural resource revenue, 
or simple unexplained differences. As a result, automated merging of the data resulted in 
many instances in which there were significant breaks in the data when moving from one 
source to the other – either the source that was selected was inconsistent with alternative 
sources, or there were problems with the treatment of natural resource revenue. Even the 
internal dataset developed by the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department, which relies solely on IMF 
and OECD datasets, encounters problems of discontinuity when merging data from distinct 
sources. 
 
The relative imperfection of the automated data merging exercise in turn necessitated the 
implementation of a systematic manual data cleaning process. This process has required 
that every country-year data point be manually reviewed in order to identify any 
inconsistencies or problems with the merged data, with problematic data replaced by 
superior data where necessary and appropriate. This process of manual cleaning has 
introduced a modestly subjective element to the selection of data for the final dataset, but is 
the only plausible method for overcoming the varied sources of inconsistency across data 
sources. In order to make the process as credible as possible, every effort has been made to 
ensure that the process has been systematic, and, most importantly, to document 
transparently the sources for each data point and the specific justification for adopting 
particular data whenever it is ambiguous. The edited working dataset, containing all of these 
explanations, is available upon request in order to allow all data choices to be scrutinised.  
 
Broadly, the data cleaning process has included three stages, which are described in turn. 
 
2.5.1 Inconsistencies, completeness and appropriate sources 
 
The first stage involved a general review of the merged data to identify cases in which there 
were outright inconsistencies or errors, or in which there were opportunities to improve data 
coverage or quality. This involved several overlapping activities: 
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Identifying data inconsistencies. The most basic task was to review every transition 
between data sources in order to ensure consistency between the two sources being 
merged. Generally speaking, this involved ensuring that the two sources being juxtaposed 
had identical, or near identical, data during overlapping years, and could thus be considered 
comparable. Where two data sources that had been juxtaposed were not fully consistent 
there was a need either: (a) to employ an alternative data source that could achieve greater 
consistency; or (b) to remove the offending data entirely, sacrificing coverage in order to 
ensure accuracy. 
 
Scanning for irregular data. In the same spirit, every data entry was scanned for any 
irregular data, most often in the form of unusually high or low tax values, or very rapid 
changes in levels of revenue collection. Where such irregularities were identified, specific 
checks were conducted against alternative data sources and historical developments in the 
relevant countries in order to assess the plausibility of the data. Where there were strong 
reasons to question the validity of the data, such as major contradictions between alternative 
data sources, it was excluded, replaced or flagged as potentially problematic. 
 
Identifying opportunities for improved data coverage. Alongside scanning for potentially 
problematic data, efforts were also made to improve data coverage by calculating missing 
values from available sub-components. Owing to the imperfections of existing sources, as 
well as different classification systems, it is common, for example, to find sources that report 
all of the sub-component of direct (or indirect) taxes, but do not report the aggregate figure 
for direct (or indirect) tax. In these cases simple arithmetic operations have been carried out 
(and noted) in order to improve coverage. 
 
Identifying discrepancies in the recording of indirect taxes. There are occasional 
discrepancies across sources in the allocation of revenue between taxes on goods and 
services, and taxes on international trade. Most often this results from differences across 
countries and sources in whether sales taxes (including Value Added Tax (VAT)) collected at 
the border are reported as taxes on goods and services, or taxes on international trade. This 
issue has been previously identified in the creation of the Keen and Mansour (2009) dataset, 
which uses Article IV data to construct a time series for taxes on international trade for 
African countries that is strictly exclusive of sales taxes collected at the border. 
Unfortunately, other international sources frequently do not allow for drawing this distinction 
consistently and confidently. As such, the objective here has been to ensure consistency 
within individual countries by identifying any cases in which there is a dramatic shift of 
revenue from one category to another, with subsequent efforts to identify data sources that 
are consistent over time. We return in the next section to a discussion of continuing 
imperfections in the data related to the sub-components of indirect taxes. 
 
Identifying other discrepancies in revenue classification across sources. Finally, the 
data cleaning process has involved identifying cases where tax revenue is classified under 
different sub-components by different sources. Thus, for example, one source may classify 
certain tax revenue as other taxes, while an alternative source classifies those same taxes 
as taxes on goods and services. In these cases we have first attempted to identify sources 
that are mutually consistent over time; failing such consistency, we have removed data for 
the sub-components of tax revenue where data has not been compatible with surrounding 
years. 
 
2.5.2 Accounting for natural resource revenue 
 
The second stage of manual data cleaning has focused on accounting consistently for 
natural resource revenue. As noted earlier, countries and data sources vary in whether 
natural resource revenue is recorded as tax revenue, non-tax revenue or, frequently, some 
combination of the two. The only source that consistently accounts specifically for natural 
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resource revenue is IMF Article IV reports; OECD Tax Statistics, for both the OECD and 
Latin America, often also make this distinction apparent in detailed country tables. Given 
these objectives, IMF Article IV (or occasionally OECD) data has been employed for any 
country in which tax revenue data reported in the major international database includes 
significant resource revenue.  
 
The goal of the data cleaning process has been to ensure that for countries with significant 
resource wealth, resource revenue is consistently either: (a) recorded as non-tax revenue, or 
(b) separated out from the non-resource component of tax revenue. The minimum objective 
of the data cleaning is to have a clean set of tax revenue figures that are exclusive of natural 
resource revenue, as this is frequently the figure that is of greatest analytical and policy 
interest. Meanwhile, the ideal scenario is to be able to identify separately: (a) the magnitude 
of non-resource revenue, including both tax and non-tax revenue; and (b) the magnitude of 
resource revenue, including both tax and non-tax revenue.  
 
In practice, it has almost always been possible to achieve the good enough objective of 
isolating non-resource tax revenue, thus offering a relatively complete time series for this 
variable. By contrast, it has frequently been impossible to disaggregate non-tax revenue 
between its resource and non-resource components. In these cases the dataset thus tell us 
precisely how much non-resource tax revenue a country collects, but cannot distinguish 
resource revenue and other types of non-tax revenue – thus preventing an overall measure 
of total resource revenue. In these cases the total resource revenue and the resource 
component of non-tax revenue variables are left blank. 
 
Finally, there are a relatively small number of cases in which it has been impossible to 
separate resource taxation from other forms of tax revenue, such that tax revenue continues 
to be inflated by the proceeds of resource extraction. This has generally occurred where 
Article IV data has been unavailable or unusually incomplete. As described in greater detail 
below, this data has been flagged as analytically problematic for econometric analysis 
because of its inconsistency with surrounding data.  
 
2.5.3 Accounting for social contributions 
 
While accounting consistently for natural resource revenue marks the most important single 
innovation in the ICTD dataset, a less widely recognised issue relates to inconsistency 
across sources (including between pre- and post-1990 IMF GFS data) in the treatment of 
social contributions. Social contributions are variously treated as a separate category, tax 
revenue, non-tax revenue or excluded entirely, depending on the source and country. As 
such, the final stage of the data cleaning process has focused on ensuring that all tax and 
revenue data in the ICTD GRD is reported inclusive and exclusive of social contributions, 
and that data is consistently classified between the two categories. 
 
These adjustments are, for the most part, straightforward. While data sources vary in their 
classification of social contributions, they are generally consistent both across and within 
countries. However, this is not always the case, and several types of problems arise.  
 
First, data drawn from Article IV reports can pose particular problems owing to highly varied 
reporting both within and across countries. Where Article IV reports are ambiguous or 
irregular, it has been necessary to collect and classify data in such a way as to be consistent 
with alternative data sources.  
 
Second, data from the IMF GFS needs to be dealt with cautiously, as, for example, data for 
the consolidated public sector generally includes much higher levels of social contributions 
than budgetary data. In these cases it is essential that the data employed in any individual 
country be consistent over time, lest discontinuities be introduced in the data.  
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Third, for some countries certain types of payroll taxes are highly ambiguous in whether they 
should be treated as social contributions or income taxes, thus leading to discrepancies 
across sources. In many cases it is possible to resolve these discrepancies by reclassifying 
data from one or the other source, though in some cases it has been necessary to exclude 
ambiguous data in order to ensure accuracy.  
 
Fourth, for some developing countries the quality of data reporting is limited, leading to a 
failure to report social contributions consistently. In these cases Article IV reports, for 
example, may reveal that social contributions exist, but these contributions may not be 
treated separately within the IMF GFS, making it impossible to distinguish social 
contributions from other types of government revenue effectively. Where social contributions 
appear to be relatively large (normally greater than 1 per cent of GDP), columns for tax and 
revenue exclusive of social contributions (which are most relevant for econometric analysis 
because of the greater completeness of the data series) are left blank. Meanwhile, social 
contributions have been assumed to be zero when they are comparatively negligible in 
magnitude.  
 
2.6 Ensuring comparability between unitary and federal states 
 
The final element in the production of the ICTD dataset has been an effort to account 
appropriately for differences between central government and general government data. In 
principle, the major international datasets collect data for central, state (where applicable) 
and local levels of government, which are then aggregated into general government revenue 
data, as illustrated in Figure 7. However, in practice data for sub-national levels is frequently 
unavailable for developing countries, with data then only being available for central 
government. As a result, most cross-country research dealing with developing countries has 
historically focused on central government data only, in order to maximise data coverage. 
However, while central government data provides a relatively accurate measure of 
government revenue in highly centralised countries, it often substantially underestimates 
revenue collection in more decentralised countries, with the potential to severely distort 
econometric results or cross-national comparisons.  
 
Figure 7 General government and its subsectors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The most viable solution to this problem is to rely on central government data for centralised 
countries (for which general government data is not available), but to rely on general 
government data for all countries with significant sub-national revenue sources. In principle 
this approach risks creating a new set of distortions by ignoring sub-national revenue 
sources in highly centralised countries. However, in practice sub-national tax revenue 
generally accounts for less than 5 per cent of total tax revenue, and often a significantly 
smaller proportion, in highly centralised (generally low-income) countries. As such, any 
distortion of this type is likely to be negligible, whereas the distortions implied by relying 
solely on central government data are comparatively very large.  
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Consistent with this logic, several recent papers from the IMF have adopted this approach, 
but have done so imperfectly. Acosta-Ormaechea and Yoo (2012) employ general 
government data for comparatively decentralised OECD countries, but do so for only two 
decentralised developing states (Argentina and Brazil). Benedek et al. (2012) similarly 
employ general government data in some cases, but their approach is more ad hoc and 
inconsistent. By contrast, the approach here has been to systematically employ general 
government data whenever it is available,18 while excluding central government data where 
there is evidence that sub-national data is substantial but unavailable. A full list of countries 
and the relevant level of data employed is available on request, and also captured in the 
dataset itself.  
 
 
3  Remaining limitations and challenges 
 
Through the data compilation, merging and cleaning described so far, the ICTD dataset 
achieves substantially better data coverage than any single existing source, as detailed in 
Table A3. At least as important as the level of data coverage, however, is the improved 
accuracy of the data. As has already been noted, existing international sources have been 
systematically unable to deal effectively with resource revenue, while they have also at times 
been characterised by problematic GDP series and inconsistent data. Meanwhile, attempts 
to construct composite datasets have, as reflected most notably in the IMF Fiscal Affairs 
Dataset, been plagued by further inaccuracies resulting from discrepancies between 
alternative data sources. The ICTD dataset achieves major improvements in accuracy on all 
of these counts, by dealing systematically with natural resource revenue and through 
painstaking manual cleaning of merged data.  
 
Having noted these achievements, however, there remain inescapable limitations that 
demand explicit acknowledgement. If there is an overriding message that emerges from the 
process of producing this dataset, it is that reliable econometric research demands a clear 
understanding of the limitations of available data. With this in mind, what follows recounts the 
key issues that demand attention, moving from the relatively concrete and manageable to the 
more general and unresolvable.  
 
3.1 Problems flagged in the dataset 
 
In various instances there are data inconsistencies or other problems that cannot be resolved 
using any available international sources. In these cases data has been flagged as 
potentially problematic in various ways, in the expectation that researchers will exclude this 
data as appropriate to their analysis. These flags within the primary dataset are as follows: 
 
3.1.1 Unresolvable inconsistency with surrounding data 
 
The first flag, Prob1, excludes data for which there are seemingly obvious problems with 
either revenue figures or related GDP figures, thus arguing in favour of exclusion from 
econometric analysis. This is generally the case where figures are dramatically out of line 
with surrounding years and where there are reasons to be sceptical of data quality. This may 
result from dramatic currency developments, either through revaluation or rapid inflation, as 
they can make it difficult to reconcile LCU revenue figures with available GDP figures (e.g. 
Brazil 1990-1994, central government), or may reflect seemingly implausible swings in 
revenue performance from year to year (e.g. Equatorial Guinea 1980-84). Beyond cases 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18  The one exception is in cases where general government data is virtually identical to central government data but 
provides significantly less complete data coverage. 
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where data is quite obviously problematic, we also flag twc2, treat with caution 2, a slightly 
wider set of cases in which there are reasons to treat the data with some scepticism owing to 
sharp year-to-year variation (e.g. Kazakhstan 1990-1995), a not-quite-perfect match with 
other data sources (e.g. Cambodia 2006), or implausibly high values (e.g. Liberia, particularly 
1980-88). 
 
3.1.2 Insufficient data to account for resource revenue 
 
The second flag, Prob2, excludes data where it is impossible to isolate resource revenue 
from official tax revenue figures, thus making the data analytically incomparable to other 
years and countries. In a few cases all data for particular countries falls into this category 
(e.g. Libya), but it is more common that this applies only to a subset of available country-
years (e.g. Angola 1992, UAE 1990-1996). In these cases the non-resource component of 
the tax revenue variable is also left blank, signalling our inability to exclude resource 
revenue, while the flag is included in order to signal the existence of the problem. 
 
For countries that are known to have access to modest resource revenue (believed to lie in 
the range of 1-2 per cent of GDP,19 and not appearing to cause any noticeable discontinuity 
in the data series), we view the data as likely suitable for econometric analysis, though we 
attach a separate flag, twc1 (treat with caution 1). Finally, where countries are known to have 
relatively negligible resource revenue (believed to be less than 1 per cent of GDP) the data is 
not flagged at all (e.g. Ghana).  
 
In addition to cases in which it is impossible to exclude resource revenue from total tax 
figures, which are flagged as Prob2, there are a subset of cases in which it is possible to 
exclude resource revenue from total tax revenue, but not from the sub-components of tax 
revenue. In these cases the relevant sub-components of tax revenue (direct taxes, indirect 
taxes, taxes on income, profits and capital gains, taxes on corporate income) include distinct 
categories for resource and non-resource components of tax revenue, and the non-resource 
variable is left blank in order to signal our inability to exclude resource revenue. However, we 
also include a flag, Prob4, in the dataset in order to signal the existence of this problem, as 
well as the possibility that the sub-components of indirect taxes (which do not have distinct 
resource and non-resource variables attached to them) may also be inclusive of some 
quantity of resource revenue. 
 
3.1.3 Analytically incomparable data 
 
The third flag, Prob3, is used to highlight data that is technically accurate but may be 
problematic for some types of research because it is not strictly analytically comparable to 
surrounding data. This relates most commonly to cases where there is a disproportionate 
role of SOEs in generating government revenue; we also apply the same flag to Namibia 
until 1990, when it achieved full independence.  
 
The motivation for flagging countries with disproportionately large state-owned sectors lies 
first in a particularly unclear distinction between retained profits of SOEs and taxation, and 
consequent differences across countries in whether revenue from SOEs is recorded as tax or 
non-tax revenue. Alternative accounting choices can drive potentially major changes in the 
apparent composition of government revenue. The most striking example of this 
phenomenon arises in Vietnam, which in 1988 shifted towards recording revenue from SOEs 
as tax revenue, after previously recording the same revenue as non-tax revenue. The result 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19  Following the general classification employed by IMF Article IV reports, which includes corporate and export taxes paid 
directly by resource firms, but generally appears to exclude other indirect taxes as well as income taxes paid by 
employees.  
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was an increase in reported tax revenue from roughly 3 per cent of GDP in 1987 to almost 14 
per cent of GDP in 1988 (which subsequently fell to 10 per cent in 1989, thus further 
highlighting the potential volatility of reported revenue where definitions are unclear). In this 
case it has thus been necessary to flag the pre-1988 data as incompatible with subsequent 
data. 
 
There is also a more fundamental conceptual question about how we should think 
analytically about taxation within a largely state-controlled economy. Tax revenue within 
state-controlled economies is largely an accounting measure applied to SOEs, with only 
partial analytical comparability to efforts to tax private firms within a market context. In these 
contexts governments may impose extremely high taxes on state-owned firms, but these are 
not directly borne by citizen owners. Instead, governments are, in effect, taxing their own 
retained profits. This discrepancy becomes most frequently apparent and relevant in cases in 
which countries have undergone rapid transitions from state-controlled economies to 
comparatively market-oriented economies. In these cases tax revenue, as quoted in official 
sources, tends to decline very rapidly and unevenly as a result of the transition.  
 
However, this may be analytically misleading as the privatisation of state-owned firms often 
involves lower taxes in an accounting sense, but also involves citizen-owners directly bearing 
those taxes for the first time, implying a quite different political and administrative dynamic. 
This analytical distinction is amplified by a more pragmatic concern: during these transitional 
years we often observe extremely high levels of volatility from year to year in reported 
revenue figures, thus calling data quality into question, and at a minimum making these 
cases outliers in the broader dataset. As such, data up to and including such transitions is 
generally flagged until the point that tax and revenue figures stabilise, with this arising most 
commonly in post-Soviet states during the period 1990-1995.20 
 
3.2 The problem of disentangling goods and services taxes and trade taxes 
 
As explained previously, there are occasionally differences across sources or within 
countries over time in whether sales taxes (including VAT) collected at the border are 
classified as taxes on goods and services, or taxes on international trade. As discussed in 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005), the ideal scenario is to have a consistent classification across 
and within countries, most likely by treating sales taxes on imports as taxes on goods and 
services, and distinct from taxes on international trade. However, in practice available data 
does not make it possible to draw this distinction across all countries and years. While 
Baunsgaard and Keen (2005) and Keen and Mansour (2009) achieve this distinction by 
relying on IMF Article IV reports, those reports are not publicly available for all countries and 
often do not cover all revenue categories, making reliance on this strategy highly imperfect 
given the broader goals of this dataset.  
 
As such, we opt for a pragmatic, though less perfect, solution: we ensure that data 
classification is consistent over time within countries in order to avoid any breaks in the data 
series, while accepting that in some cases the classification of revenue between taxes on 
goods and services, and taxes on international trade, may vary across countries.  
 
We would welcome future efforts to establish a completely consistent categorisation over 
time and across countries – ideally using the ICTD dataset as a starting point – but for the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20  Illustrative of the motivation for this correction to the data is the case of Poland. Officially, tax collection in Poland 
declined from 36% of GDP in 1988 to around 21% in 1991, indicating a dramatic reduction in the tax burden that is not 
matched by any state in the dataset outside of former Soviet states. However, Easter (2008) has written about the 
extent to which the imposition of new tax burdens during this period, largely through income tax, served to mobilise 
political demands for accountability. This divergence between official statistics and lived experience highlights the 
potentially misleading nature of data during these transitional periods. 
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time being these definitional inconsistencies across countries appear inescapable, though we 
believe them to be modest in magnitude. In broad terms, two solutions for econometric 
research present themselves. First, these concerns are significantly addressed by the use of 
within-country econometric estimators, as the classification scheme is consistent within 
countries but not necessarily across countries. In the context of within-country analysis, a 
decline in the relative share of trade taxes, as reported in the dataset, can sensibly be 
understood as such, even if trade taxes also includes some goods and services taxes 
collected at the border. Second, reliance on the aggregate indirect tax measure avoids this 
definitional problem, and is appropriate unless the research is specifically focused on the 
distinction between taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international trade. 
 
3.3 Problems accounting for resource revenue 
 
By drawing on Article IV data for resource-rich countries, the ICTD dataset achieves a 
dramatic improvement in the consistency and analytical appropriateness of the data as it 
relates to resource and non-resource components of tax revenue. However, it is important to 
emphasise that the measures adopted here do not represent a perfect solution – and, 
indeed, that a perfect solution is likely not possible based on existing sources. 
 
Most simply, there continue to be a handful of countries for which IMF Article IV data does 
not exist,21 or for which it does not allow for distinguishing between the resource and non-
resource components of tax revenue. In these cases the only available solution for most 
research projects is to exclude the data from the dataset entirely, as it is not analytically 
comparable to data from other countries. This, evidently, implies non-random missing data in 
the final dataset, though such instances are relatively rare. There is significant value in 
efforts by international organisations to collect higher quality and more systematic data about 
resource revenue, as both the IMF and OECD have begun to do.  
 
More broadly, there remains an inescapable possibility of differences across countries in the 
definition of resource revenue – for example, countries and sources may vary in whether 
indirect taxes paid by resource firms are counted as resource revenue. This definitional 
uncertainty is reflected in modest differences between the data reported here and resource 
revenue figures reported elsewhere, including by the IMF (2012) and Haber and Menaldo 
(2011).22 Recognising that there is unlikely to be a perfect solution to these definitional issues 
surrounding historical data, we aim to minimise definitional inconsistency by relying almost 
exclusively on IMF Article IV data to account for resource revenue. The resulting corrections 
to the data appear to be broadly credible, and to produce realistic fiscal profiles for resource-
rich states. Our instinct is that our approach is likely to be as or more consistent over time 
and across countries (and more easily verifiable by other researchers) than reliance on 
diverse country-level sources, but the limits of available data imply that this question may be 
technically unresolvable. 
 
Finally, while IMF Article IV reports account separately for resource revenue in the significant 
majority of resource-rich countries, they do not consistently account for resource revenue 
where it is relatively modest (as is the case in many low-income countries with significant, but 
weakly taxed, mining sectors). As discussed earlier, our judgement is that while this issue 
should not be entirely ignored, it is modest enough in magnitude to be acceptable for 
analytical purposes – while there is, to our knowledge, no readily available solution. IMF 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21  Or, at least, does not exist in the public domain. 
22  Haber and Menaldo (2011) construct a measure of fiscal reliance, defined as the share of natural resource revenue in 
total government revenue. The ICTD GRD allows for calculating effectively the inverse of this figure, tax reliance, 
defined as the share of non-resource tax revenue in total revenue. The correlation between the two variables during the 
period 1990-2010, when the data is most complete, is -0.93, implying a very high degree of correspondence across the 
two sources. 
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Article IV reports generally account systematically for resource revenue once it exceeds 1-2 
per cent of GDP, while in countries below this threshold the majority of resource revenue 
generally appears to come in the form of royalties rather than corporate income taxes, and 
royalties are almost always recorded as non-tax revenue. However, with rising mineral prices 
and improved taxation of the mining sector in at least some low-income countries, there is a 
particular need for careful attention to the potential for distortions to the data post-2010.23 
 
3.4 Inherent limitations of available data and the value of transparency 
 
While the discussion so far has highlighted relatively specific and persistent challenges within 
the dataset, it is useful to conclude with a caution about the inherent imperfection of the 
dataset and of cross-country government revenue figures generally. 
 
With respect to the dataset itself, this paper has described the process of manual data 
cleaning at length. This cleaning process has been both thorough and systematic, in order to 
make it as accurate and objective as possible. However, a degree of subjectivity is inevitable. 
As has been noted, there are frequent, persistent and difficult to explain differences in the 
revenue figures reported by different international sources. In distinguishing between these 
sources we have had no option but to make our most informed judgement about which 
source is most credible and accurate, based on whether it is consistent with other sources, 
internally consistent and highly disaggregated. These decisions have been made with great 
care, but are not beyond any possible dispute. Unfortunately, there is no prospect of knowing 
with certainty – particularly for data further in the past – what data source or observation is 
inarguably best. As such, our approach has been to offer transparency about the data 
choices that have been made, and their broad justification.  
 
Despite this transparency there will inevitably be researchers who feel that these choices are 
suboptimal in particular cases. Some will argue for relying on a single data source – and, as 
a result, for regionally-focused studies – based on a belief that definitional differences across 
sources cannot allow for data merging of the type undertaken here. Our contention is that, 
from the perspective of researchers and policymakers, the benefits of data merging 
dramatically outweigh any minor distortions that may arise from differences in definitions 
across sources. This is a view, tellingly, that has been implicitly embraced in their recent 
work by researchers at the IMF Fiscal Affairs Department.  
 
Others will be tempted to embrace the broad approach here, but argue for slightly different 
data choices. In principle, it is certainly possible to make a case for alternative data choices 
in particular instances. However, while there may be scope for marginal improvements 
through alternative choices, or by drawing on additional sources, we would argue that these 
benefits are likely to be outweighed by the tremendous costs to research of the proliferation 
of idiosyncratic datasets, and of thus generating non-comparable results. The documentation 
being presented alongside this dataset is an effort to secure some degree of consensus, 
even while recognising the inescapable imperfections of the dataset.  
 
Beyond the limitations of the data selection process employed here, it is equally important to 
recognise the inherent limitations of underlying data from national authorities. Recent work 
by Jerven (2013b) has shed light on the sometimes highly imperfect processes underpinning 
national data collection in Africa, and similar challenges almost certainly exist elsewhere in 
the developing world. For this reason, there is a strong case for avoiding policy and research 
conclusions that are driven by very small trends in the data. If there is one positive to a 
recognition of the imperfections of available data ‘at the source’ it is this: it offers a further 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23  Zambia, Tanzania and Mozambique are examples of countries in which tax collection from the mining sector appears to 
be increasing somewhat in recent years, thus raising the importance of more effective data gathering. 
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argument in favour of seeking data that is broadly complete and accurate rather than fixating 
on marginal definitional issues, which are likely to be swamped in any case by broader 
imperfections in data collection. 
 
Finally, the most glaring issue affecting the data continues to relate not to the raw revenue 
data, but to questionable GDP figures – and correspondingly problematic tax-to-GDP ratios. 
The high profile example of dramatic GDP rebasing in Ghana in 2010 – and a subsequent 
precipitous fall in the tax-to-GDP ratio – is emblematic of much broader trends on the 
continent, which risk offering a misleading picture of actual levels of tax collection across 
countries. The problems posed by the underestimation of GDP are most modest in relation to 
short-term trends. That is, patterns of year-to-year variation in tax collection tend to be 
relatively similar – though not identical – whether GDP has been updated or not. Problems 
become more acute when looking at long-term trends, as progressively greater 
underestimation of GDP over time can create the appearance that tax revenue is increasing 
substantially more quickly as a share of GDP than is in fact the case. Finally, a focus on the 
magnitude of tax-to-GDP ratios across countries can be extremely misleading when GDP is 
underestimated, implying major risks in using tax-to-GDP ratios to draw comparisons across 
countries unless those countries have both recently updated their GDP figures.  
 
These different dimensions of the problem can be seen clearly in Figure 6 above, which 
compares tax data for Ghana with and without updated GDP figures. Year-to-year variation 
in tax collection follows relatively similar trends with the old and new GDP figures – though 
reliance on the older GDP figures underestimates the decline in tax collection in the late 
1990s. By contrast, larger problems are apparent in looking at long term trends, as the older, 
not updated, figures suggest a much more rapid increase in tax collection than was in fact 
the case. Finally, the problems of cross-country comparison are stark. In 2009, before 
rebasing its GDP, Ghana appeared to be among the most successful tax collectors in the 
developing world, while in 2010, post-rebasing, Ghana’s tax performance appeared relatively 
average. The reality likely lies somewhere between those extremes, as we know that figures 
for neighbouring countries in many cases continue to be overestimated owing to out-of-date 
GDP series.24 
 
For practitioners, the limits of available data suggest the need for appropriate caution in 
using tax-to-GDP ratios to compare countries, or to assert that one country is unambiguously 
outperforming another. At least equally problematic are efforts to deploy relatively universal 
revenue targets, expressed as a share of GDP, across countries. In the past, for example, 
observers have suggested that countries should collect a minimum of 15 per cent of GDP in 
tax revenue to promote sustainable development.25 However, implementing such a target is 
fraught with risks, as whether a country makes this cut-off point may depend as much on 
how it calculates GDP figures as on the effectiveness of tax collection. This is not to suggest 
that the data cannot be useful for cross-country comparison, but simply that such exercises 
need to be approached with caution, and with an appreciation of the inherent imperfection of 
such efforts. 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24  For this reason, econometric models that focus on within country variation, and particularly which focus on short-term 
changes in tax collection, appear likely to be relatively robust to problems with GDP measurement. By contrast, models 
that rely primarily on cross-country variation are more likely to offer misleading results. 
25  Per IMF (2011: 7): ‘This common but arbitrary benchmark appears to date back to Kaldor (1963)’. 
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4  A new picture of revenue trends over time 
 
Having reviewed the construction of the dataset and its limitations, it is useful to conclude by 
reviewing key trends in tax and revenue collection over time, across regions and across 
income groups. This is a seemingly straightforward task, and researchers and policymakers 
have long cited figures purporting to capture these key revenue trends. However, in reality 
these figures have often been fundamentally misleading owing to the limitations of available 
data described so far.  
 
In some cases misleading information about levels of, and trends in, tax collection has 
resulted from relying on incomplete data. In these cases average revenue trends for different 
regions or country groupings have actually captured trends for only a much smaller handful 
of countries for which data is available.26 While the development of better quality regional 
datasets for Africa (AEO) and Latin America (CEPAL and CEPAL/OECD) has addressed this 
problem for those regions, it has remained impossible to paint a relatively complete picture of 
performance in other regions, or across the entire group of low-income or developing 
countries. A 2011 IMF Board paper on revenue mobilisation is thus forced to rely on group 
medians, rather than means, in calculating tax trends over time within income groups, owing 
in part to missing data. 
 
More common problems have arisen from inconsistency in the recording of revenue from 
natural resource sectors, and particularly petroleum production. Because tax collection as 
recorded by existing international databases often includes significant taxation of natural 
resource wealth, the world’s largest oil producers frequently appear to be the most 
successful tax collectors. While this classification may be accurate from an accounting 
perspective it obscures the actual point of interest, which most often is to understand the 
burden of taxation on society and the extent to which the government is able to extract 
revenue effectively from citizens. Making matters worse is that the classification of natural 
resource revenue between the tax and non-tax categories varies across countries, creating 
further inconsistency in any resultant figures or analysis.27  
 
An interesting example is the 2010 African Economic Outlook, which explores trends in tax 
collection across Africa. To its credit, it at times reports tax trends both inclusive and 
exclusive of resource revenue. However, most tax figures in the report are reported inclusive 
of resource revenue, such that, for example, the first table in the report lists the following 
countries as the top tax collectors in the region: Libya (oil), Equatorial Guinea (oil), 
Seychelles (oil), Gabon (oil), Algeria (oil), Angola (oil) and Botswana (diamonds). A 2011 IMF 
Board paper reporting trends in tax collection among developing counties is similarly unable 
to account systematically for the role of resource revenue in shaping the tax trends over time 
that it reports, other than by removing resource-rich countries entirely from the sample in a 
few instances (IMF 2011). Simply, a lack of consistent attention to the distinction between 
resource and non-resource taxation can lead to misleading messages – and this distinction is 
not made consistently in most publicly available sources.28  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Thus, for example, in a widely cited paper by Bird and Zolt (2005) on the role of income taxes in developing countries, 
data limitations entail that the share of income taxes in Africa is actually calculated as the average share of income 
taxes in only nine countries, many of which are disproportionately successful income tax collectors by regional 
standards: Burundi, Cote d’Ivoire, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe. 
27  Conventionally, the result is that countries that are home to significant oil production by private firms appear among the 
world’s top tax collectors, while similarly resource-rich countries that rely on national petroleum companies appear 
among the worst tax collectors, as almost all revenue is classified as non-tax revenue. 
28  This statement applies equally to the dataset compiled for the AEO, as the disaggregation of resource and non-resource 
taxation in the 2010 AEO is achieved using the dataset developed by Keen and Mansour (2009), discussed above. 
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Finally, misleading tax collection trends over time can arise from employing data that does 
not update historical GDP figures to reflect country-specific GDP rebasing. Thus, for 
example, the internal dataset employed by IMF Fiscal Affairs Department researchers 
merges data from several alternative sources, while employing distinct, source-specific, GDP 
series. This minimally results in minor inconsistency across sources based on GDP series. 
However, greater problems arise from the fact that data from the IMF GFS is paired with 
GDP data from the IMF IFS, which is not retrospectively updated to reflect GDP rebasing 
exercises. The result is that, for example, reported tax collection in Ghana declines from 20.6 
per cent of GDP in 2005 to 12.8 per cent in 2006 as a result of a break in the underlying GDP 
series. More broadly reflective of the lack of attention to the importance of underlying GDP 
series is that the 2010 AEO report noted above does not report which GDP figures are 
employed in calculating tax shares of GDP. 
 
The ICTD GRD allows us to present what we believe to be the most accurate data available 
on levels and trends in non-resource tax collection across countries over time. We employ 
the region and income group categorisations employed by the World Bank, while we divide 
high-income countries into OECD and non-OECD groups. Because of the risk that trends 
may be driven by missing data and consequent changes in the composition of the sample 
over time, we exclude from the analysis countries for which data is available for less than 
fifteen of the twenty years in the sample from 1990-2009.29 We generally also exclude data 
for 2010, which has a larger number of missing observations, particularly for resource 
producers. We focus primarily on more aggregated tax categories (total taxes, direct taxes, 
indirect taxes) in order to minimise the impact of missing data or of differences in revenue 
classification across sources. For the sake of transparency, the notes to the country and 
income group tables include a full list of the countries included and excluded.  
 
Against this background, the Figures reported in Appendix 3 highlight several key messages, 
though readers should bear in mind the continuing risk that tax ratios may be overestimated 
in low-income countries, in particular owing to the underestimation of GDP. 
 
4.1 Consistent increases in tax collection over time 
 
First, and perhaps most strikingly, overall tax collection exhibited a strongly upward trend in 
the developing world over the two decades ending in 2009/2010, and this pattern was 
relatively consistent across income groups and regions (Figures A3.1-A3.6). Among 
developing countries as a group,30 non-resource tax collection increased from an average of 
about 13 per cent of GDP in 1990 to about 16 per cent in 2009 (Figure A3.6). This pattern is 
broadly consistent with patterns reported for non-resource producing states in the 2011 IMF 
Board paper (IMF 2011: 14), though the pattern here is both more consistent and more 
pronounced.31  
 
The apparent implication of this evidence is that investments in tax reform across the 
developing world over the past two decades have, in fact, yielded higher revenue. As 
discussed above, a set of important research questions can now be explored with the ICTD 
dataset, including whether such revenue gains have in turn been associated with higher 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29  Note that for the vast majority of countries we have complete time series, or are missing at most two observations over 
twenty years, while the trends overall do not prove sensitive to the exclusion restrictions. For countries in Eastern and 
Central Europe, data from the early 1990s is very volatile and much more incomplete, so we begin the analysis in 1997, 
including countries for which we have at least ten observations from 1997 through 2010. 
30  We include in this category low-income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income countries. 
31  This may simply be the result of more consistent and complete data, and of the inclusion of resource-rich states. An 
alternative possibility is that it may also reflect the use of a consistent and updated GDP series over time, as this 
eliminates occasionally artificial declines in tax collection in IMF data driven by GDP rebasing. 
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economic growth, reduced inequality, improvements in governance or broader human 
development progress. 
 
The new data suggests that progress in revenue mobilisation has been most rapid among 
low-income countries, and most notably in Africa (Figures A3.1 and A3.2). While tax 
collection has increased among all groups of developing countries, the rate of increase has 
been highest among low-income countries, where non-resource tax collection has increased 
about 30 per cent, from less than 10 per cent of GDP to almost 13 per cent of GDP (Figure 
A3.3). This increase is mirrored by trends in Sub-Saharan Africa, where average non-
resource tax collection has increased from less than 12 per cent of GDP to more than 15 per 
cent (Figure A3.9). This same trend for Sub-Saharan Africa is sustained, though at lower 
levels, if we exclude small islands and the wealthier countries of the Southern African 
Development Community.32 Of course, this trend may be somewhat overstated relative to the 
underlying reality, owing to progressively larger underestimation of GDP over time in some 
countries. 
 
Outside of Sub-Saharan Africa, two other regional trends stand out: the rapid growth of tax 
collection in Latin America, and the relative stagnation of tax collection in South Asia. 
Historically, Latin America has been known for unexpectedly low levels of tax collection, 
which has in turn contributed to the region having some of the world’s highest levels of 
inequality. However, a range of commentators have argued that this trend has begun to shift 
(Bird and Zolt 2013), and the data here provides a stark indicator of this change, with 
average tax collection increasingly steadily from less than 13 per cent of GDP in 1990 to 
almost 18 per cent of GDP in 2009 (Figure A3.13). Further analysis of the relationship with 
inequality will likely be valuable (see, e.g., Lustig et al. 2014). 
 
By sharp contrast, tax collection in South Asia has performed noticeably less well than in 
other developing regions. It has been far and away the worst performing region globally in 
terms of aggregate levels of tax collection, while it also experienced the most limited increase 
in collection over the two decades covered here (Figure A3.10). As has been noted 
repeatedly, unreliable GDP figures imply that caution should be exercised in comparing 
reported levels of collection across countries. Lower collection in South Asia could, 
conceivably, reflect better GDP measurement rather than lower collection. However, the lack 
of progress over time is readily apparent, while available research is consistent with the view 
that tax collection has simply been much less successful in the region than elsewhere 
(Hassan and Prichard 2013). 
 
4.2 Non-resource tax collection still very limited in many countries  
 
While tax collection has been increasing over time, once we strip away taxes on natural 
resource wealth average levels of tax collection are dramatically lower than earlier estimates. 
This changed picture is particularly stark among the group of upper middle-income countries: 
while a focus on total tax collection, including resource revenue, has revealed an average of 
almost 25 per cent of GDP in recent accounts, approaching OECD levels, non-resource tax 
collection is in fact only about 18 per cent of GDP (Figure A3.4).  
 
It has long been commonplace, though somewhat arbitrary, to argue that developing 
countries should collect a minimum of 15 per cent of GDP in tax revenue (IMF 2011: 7). 
Putting aside inherent problems with relying on such an arbitrary figure (and one that is 
dependent on accurate GDP figures), recent studies have suggested that only a relatively 
small number of countries fall below this threshold. However, stripping away resource 
revenue reveals a much larger group of countries that fail to meet this threshold. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32  This table is not reported here. 
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average level of non-resource tax collection among developing countries is less than 16 per 
cent of GDP, and less than 13 per cent for low-income countries (Figures A3.6 and A3.3). In 
2008, fully sixty-five countries in our dataset collected less than 15 per cent of GDP in non-
resource tax revenue. While this may be a rational policy choice in countries with extremely 
large resource endowments, among those that are not major resource producers33 we still 
find forty-two countries with tax collection below 15 per cent of GDP.  
 
This likely understates the reality, as it fails to account for the continued inflation of tax ratios 
resulting from the underestimation of GDP. Ghana, for example, went from being above 15 
per cent of GDP in 2009 to below 15 per cent of GDP in 2010 after rebasing its GDP. Though 
not yet reflected in the data here, a 2014 rebasing exercise in Nigeria has led to a 90 per 
cent increase in GDP – and thus revealed it as one of the most ineffective tax collectors in 
the world. A similar 25 per cent increase in GDP through a rebasing exercise in Zambia in 
2014 may see it fall below the 15 per cent of GDP target for tax collection as well. The 
likelihood of similarly underestimated GDP figures in other countries merely re-emphasises 
the still weak state of tax collection across the developing world, despite recent progress. 
Again, further research is needed to establish whether failure to reach the 15 per cent level, 
or any other, is likely to be associated with weaker development outcomes. Nevertheless, the 
revealed extent of lower collection performance is striking – and confirms once more the 
value of stronger data.  
 
4.3 Gains in both direct and indirect taxes, led by taxes on goods and services 
 
While a popular narrative has emerged in which (broadly progressive) direct taxes have been 
replaced by (broadly regressive) indirect taxes, the data tells a more complex story. On one 
hand, it appears to be true that taxes on goods and services have increased markedly more 
rapidly than any other tax category. On the other hand, direct taxes also appear to have 
increased substantially over time, and at a rate comparable to the expansion of indirect taxes 
as a whole (Figure A3.6). 
 
Among developing countries as a group, non-resource direct taxes have increased from less 
than 4 per cent of GDP to almost 6 per cent of GDP, though gains have been slightly more 
modest among low-income countries. It is somewhat more difficult to distinguish confidently 
the respective roles of corporate and individual income taxes in this trend, owing to more 
extensive missing data. Figure A3.7 provides indicative data based on the subset of 
countries with relatively complete data, and suggests that increases in direct taxes have 
been driven in about equal measure by increases in taxes on individuals and corporations. 
That direct taxes in aggregate have increased at roughly the same rate as indirect taxes is 
encouraging in light of mounting concern globally about inequality, and a widespread 
understanding that poor enforcement of personal income taxes has been an endemic 
challenge in developing countries. 
  
Progress in collecting direct taxes should not, however, obscure the dominant role of 
expanded VAT and sales tax collection in driving overall tax trends. While indirect taxes 
collectively have increased at a rate similar to direct taxes, this masks rapid increases in 
taxes on goods and services, which have been partially offset by declining trade taxes. 
Figure A3.8 presents trends in data for aggregate indirect taxes, as well as goods and 
services and trade taxes separately, while employing data only for countries with at least 
sixteen observations on each of the three variables. Within the sample of countries with 
relatively complete data the pattern is stark: starting from roughly equivalent levels in 1990, 
trade taxes have declined by more than 25 per cent, while taxes on goods and services have 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33  Defined as countries that receive less than 10% of GDP from natural resources and other forms of non-tax revenue. 
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increased by over 80 per cent – far more rapidly than any other revenue category. Further 
research on the impact of compositional changes in tax revenue is much needed.  
 
4.4 Tax revenue more resilient than non-tax revenue during the financial crisis 
 
Finally, the data suggests that across the developing world non-resource tax collection was 
much more resilient to the impact of the 2008 financial crisis than non-tax revenue. Across all 
developing country income groups and most regions, total tax collection was constant or 
slightly increasing in 2009, whereas non-tax revenue, of which resource wealth is the primary 
component, declined everywhere in the same year – sometimes dramatically (Figures A3.3-
A3.6). The decline in non-tax revenue is not surprising, as the global economic crisis led to 
falling resource prices and fiscal stress in many resource-producing states. Somewhat more 
surprising is the resilience of tax revenue after the crisis, reinforcing one of the key benefits 
of tax reliance: increased predictability of government revenue. A more speculative pattern 
suggested by the data is that these benefits may be particularly significant for low-income 
countries. Among middle-income countries (and non-OECD high-income countries) tax 
revenue was at best stagnant, perhaps reflecting their comparatively close integration into 
the global economy. By contrast, it is in low-income countries that tax collection appears to 
have been most resilient after the crisis. 
 
 
5  Conclusions and next steps 
 
The benefits of the new ICTD Government Revenue Dataset are, we think, substantial: 
irrespective of minor imperfections, the ICTD GRD provides both researchers and 
policymakers with a dataset that is dramatically more complete and more accurate than 
existing options. This, in turn, stands to provide a much more reliable foundation for 
research, while, as demonstrated here, providing a much clearer picture of historical patterns 
of tax collection.  
 
These issues should not be seen as purely technical, but have significant real world 
importance. In response to data problems, researchers within and outside key international 
organisations have either relied on data that is recognised to be problematic, or have 
constructed ad hoc alternatives that have not been fully open to public scrutiny – and which 
have been shown to include meaningful errors. These data problems have imposed 
significant limitations on our understanding of a wide variety of questions about taxation, non-
tax revenue and development, including an inability to answer even basic questions about 
key tax trends over time with confidence. More troubling is evidence that, in at least some 
cases, poor quality data has resulted in inaccurate research findings with significant policy 
implications (Clist 2014; Morrissey et al. 2014). 
 
While the ICTD dataset thus provides the basis for higher quality and replicable research 
findings, an equally important message is that it ultimately can only be as accurate and 
complete as the data on which it is built, now and in the future. The problems inherent in 
combining data from multiple sources – quite aside from the enormous effort required – are 
readily apparent, while the sustainability of any such process is an enduring challenge. 
Meanwhile, even our best efforts cannot overcome still significant gaps where there are not 
any publicly available sources providing adequate data. While some researchers have 
admirably sought to return to country-level statistical sources to fill such gaps, this process, 
when not undertaken systematically by international organisations, opens additional 
questions about the comparability of data over time and across space.  
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Given these limitations, the ICTD GRD is best understood as an intermediate measure for 
improving the quality of government revenue data. In the presence of major challenges with 
existing data, it offers a dramatically improved foundation for immediate research and policy 
advice. However, over the long term the task of constructing a complete, reliable and 
sustainable cross-country government revenue dataset, suitable for high-quality research, is 
best undertaken by international organisations themselves. It is only these international 
organisations that have the reach and resources needed to put in place a standard system of 
classification across countries, to gather data consistently, and to ensure that these efforts 
are sustained. Optimistically, important initiatives are underway. However, the limitations of 
individual international sources remain pronounced, and overcoming them will require both 
greater resources and greater inter- and intra-organisational cooperation than appears to 
have been the case to date. 
 
Several further lessons emerge from the process of constructing the ICTD GRD. First, is the 
increasingly noted importance of consistent (and accurate) GDP data, to ensure 
comparability of tax data across countries. Second, is the critical importance of adopting a 
consistent approach to natural resource revenue, from both oil and mining, particularly as 
these revenue sources expand in many low-income countries. Third, is to address the recent 
reduction in data availability through IMF Article IV reports, which threatens the approach 
taken in the ICTD dataset and the broader availability of data in the future. 
 
Finally, attention is needed to the balance between data quality and coverage. Taken too far, 
concerns over data quality can sharply reduce the availability of data from states where 
statistics departments are particularly weak, or data disclosure particularly limited. On the 
other hand, too little attention to data quality stands to undermine the credibility of any 
international dataset. If necessary, one option may be to include information on data quality 
within international datasets, allowing researchers and policymakers to include or exclude 
less credible data depending on their needs, in a manner similar to the flags included in the 
ICTD GRD. 
 
We look forward to closer attention being paid to tax data – including, of course, through 
criticism of our work. Our hope is that the ICTD GRD described in this paper will come to be 
accepted as the best available source of historical government revenue data, that it will 
contribute to – and perhaps accelerate – discussions about the collection and dissemination 
of more complete and accurate data, and that more robust research findings and better-
supported policy decisions are the eventual result.  
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Appendices 	  
Appendix 1 Data coverage 
 
Table A1 Data coverage ICTD GRD by revenue type 1990-2010 
 Total 
revenue 
Total 
taxes 
Direct 
taxes 
Taxes 
on 
income 
Taxes on 
individual 
income 
Taxes on 
corporate 
income 
Indirect 
taxes 
Taxes 
on 
goods 
and 
services 
Taxes 
on 
trade 
Non-tax 
revenue 
Low-
Income 
578 576 506 475 347 352 504 496 513 570 
Lower 
middle- 
income 
856 856 700 655 540 518 700 664 667 838 
Upper 
middle-
income 
883 916 842 770 601 559 829 792 792 859 
High-
Income 
(non-
OECD) 
456 428 408 351 222 269 399 357 366 428 
High-
income 
(OECD) 
542 587 586 568 568 568 586 586 561 542 
Total 3465 3513 3186 2956 2392 2364 3162 3035 3043 3384 
 
 
Table A2 Data coverage ICTD GRD by revenue type 1980-2010 
 Total 
revenue 
Total 
taxes 
Direct 
taxes 
Taxes 
on 
income 
Taxes on 
individual 
income 
Taxes on 
corporate 
income 
Indirect 
taxes 
Taxes 
on 
goods 
and 
services 
Taxes 
on 
trade 
Non-tax 
revenue 
Low-
income 
804 796 646 608 422 426 640 622 651 774 
Lower 
middle- 
income 
1150 1107 811 763 608 581 818 765 791 1070 
Upper 
middle- 
income 
1163 1152 1007 916 711 655 985 961 964 1070 
High- 
income 
(Non-
OECD) 
583 525 492 426 259 319 483 442 461 525 
High- 
income 
(OECD) 
666 842 841 822 811 806 841 841 816 666 
Total 4595 4649 3996 3728 2970 2924 3966 3826 3882 4329 
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Table A3 Data availability by source and country income group 1990-201034 
  ICTD IMF Fiscal 
Affairs 
Article IV 
(Central 
Gov’t)35 
GFS 
(Central 
Gov’t36 
WDI 
(Central 
Gov’t 
Low-
income 
Total revenue 578 411 388 366 303 
Total tax 576 513 552 367 303 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
475 513 409 367 303 
Tax on goods and 
services 
496 510 382 367 303 
Lower 
middle- 
income 
Total revenue 856 709 463 591 445 
Total tax 856 693 638 598 445 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
655 650 400 598 445 
Tax on goods and 
services 
664 625 315 598 445 
Upper 
middle- 
income 
Total revenue 883 793 633 434 312 
Total tax 916 770 705 431 312 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
770 746 532 430 312 
Tax on goods and 
services 
792 721 395 430 312 
All 
developing 
countries 
Total revenue 2317 1913 1484 1391 1060 
Total tax 2348 1976 1895 1396 1060 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
1900 1909 1341 1395 1060 
Tax on goods and 
services 
1952 1856 1092 1395 1060 
High-
income 
OECD 
Total revenue 542 607 282 452 333 
Total tax 587 605 214 461 333 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
568 605 205 460 333 
Tax on goods and 
services 
586 603 150 460 333 
High-
income 
non-OECD 
Total revenue 456 351 376 227 188 
Total tax 428 353 256 234 188 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
351 322 150 234 188 
Tax on goods and 
services 
357 309 56 234 188 
All 
countries 
Total revenue 3465 3022 2250 2070 1581 
Total tax 3513 3071 2506 2091 1581 
Tax on income, profit 
and capital gains 
2956 3040 1801 2089 1581 
Tax on goods and 
services 
3035 3025 1397 2089 1581 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34  Data from international sources was extracted in late 2011 and, as a result, there remain significant gaps in data for 
2010 in the figures reported here. Updating of the data will be undertaken in due course, but short-term priority has 
been given to finalising and sharing the data publicly. 
35  Whether or not IMF Article IV reports are deemed to include taxes on income, profits and capital gains, or taxes on 
goods and services, depends to some extent on subjective judgements about the possibility of aggregating reported 
sub-components of tax revenue, which vary across countries and over time. As such, these figures should be treated as 
approximate. 
36  The data contained in the IMF GFS dataset undergoes marginal changes periodically, apparently reflecting delayed 
government reporting and judgements about what data can and cannot be included. As such the figures reported here 
are approximate, based on our download of the data in late 2011, and may not precisely match later downloads. 
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Appendix 2 Details of underlying data sources 
 
A2.1 IMF Government Finance Statistics (GFS) 
 
The IMF GFS is widely viewed as the most authoritative source of cross-country government 
revenue data. It is compiled by the organisation with primary responsibility for engaging 
countries around fiscal policy, which gives the IMF consistent access to the relevant data 
from national sources. Moreover, the GFS has, in theory at least, the most disaggregated 
data possible. Definitions of tax variables (such as taxes on income, profits and capital gains, 
or excises) can be found in the IMF Government Finance Statistics Manual 2001, while the 
key tax categories are depicted in Figure A2.1.  
 
Figure A2.1  Structure of tax classification for the IMF GFS 2001 
 
 
However, in practice, the IMF GFS still suffers from extensive missing data – even where 
such data can be found in IMF country-level sources, while many researchers, even within 
the IMF, have turned to the construction of ad hoc datasets from country-level sources. 
Critically, from the perspective of research, the IMF GFS does not make any consistent 
distinction between natural resource revenue and other sources of tax and non-tax revenue, 
with variation across countries in whether resource revenue is recorded as tax or non-tax 
revenue. 
 
Additional complexity arises from the adoption of a new classification system in 2001 
(applied retroactively to data from 1990 onwards) to replace the 1986 classification system.37 
In the revised GFS system flows are recorded on an accrual basis, whereas GFS 1986 
transactions are recorded on a cash basis. However, in practice the transition to accrual 
accounting only appears to have taken effect for about sixty out of the 153 countries for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37  Here we highlight some of the most important changes. Refer to Section 1.D and Appendix 1 of the IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Manual 2001 for a fuller account. 
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which revenue data is reported. The new classification system also shifts several revenue 
categories, as depicted in Figure A2.2. In GFS 2001 sales of non-financial assets are no 
longer classified as government revenue (as they do not affect net worth). Social 
contributions include both those from the private and public sectors, which were previously 
separated into tax and non-tax categories, respectively, with this change necessitating 
general attention to potential differences in classification across countries, as well as specific 
attention to potential discrepancies in classification between data before and after 1990. 
 
Figure A2.2 Relationship between old and new IMF classifications  
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A2.2 World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI) 
 
The World Bank uses GFS data to produce more limited data series through its World 
Development Indicators – these categories are depicted in Figure A2.3. Despite the WDI 
generally deriving from the GFS, there are instances, particularly for lower-income countries, 
in which the WDI reports data that is not contained in the GFS data series, the provenance of 
which is not entirely clear and the accuracy of which has at times been problematic.38 There 
are also occasional, and generally minor, differences in the specific data reported, while 
there are likewise cases in which the WDI does not contain data that is contained in the GFS, 
again for reasons that are not entirely clear. As such, some researchers have previously 
used WDI data to improve upon the data coverage offered by the IMF GFS alone. 
 
Figure A2.3 Structure of tax classification for the WDI 
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38  Notably, different versions of the WDI over time have included slightly different data coverage. This has presumably 
reflected changing views about the quality of particular data, but also further highlights the overall challenges associated 
with these data series. 
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A2.3 OECD Revenue Statistics 
 
The OECD collates detailed data from member countries, with strong coverage consistent 
with the relative wealth of the members, making it the most complete and detailed source of 
data for OECD countries. The OECD classification of taxes is similar to that of the IMF, 
though important differences in classification result in slight differences in data reported by 
the two sources. These differences are described in detail in The OECD Classification of 
Taxes and Interpretative Guide 2004. In OECD Revenue Statistics compulsory social 
security contributions are treated as taxes, thus attention is needed to this classification 
difference when combining with data based on the IMF classification. The OECD 
classification also combines taxes on goods and services, and taxes on international trade 
and transactions, into a single category, from which taxes on international trade and 
transactions can be extracted approximately. Finally, the OECD Revenue Statistics dataset 
focuses exclusively on tax revenue, and thus does not included total government revenue, 
which can instead be found in OECD national accounts data - though this may introduce 
minor definitional differences.39 
 
Figure A2.4 Structure of OECD tax classification  
 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39  Note that tax data in the national accounts tables is often significantly different from that contained in the OECD 
Revenue Statistics, but the latter are more consistent with the needs of this exercise. Furthermore, it is important to note 
that there can be small differences in data between the OECD Comparative Tables and their Details of Tax Revenue 
tables, with the former being preferable at the level of aggregation used for cross-country comparison. 
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A2.4 CEPALSTAT (Estadísticas de América Latina y el Caribe) 
 
The CEPALSTAT dataset is compiled by CEPAL directly from national sources. It adheres to 
the major revenue categories defined by the GFS, but within those categories follows a 
somewhat distinctive classification system, which can lead to significant, though generally 
consistent, differences between CEPAL data and that from the IMF GFS. The primary 
strength of the CEPAL dataset lies in achieving the highest degree of data coverage for Latin 
America and the Caribbean, though its compatibility with other international datasets needs 
to be treated with care. Finally, like the OECD Revenue Statistics, the CEPALSTAT Tax 
Revenue dataset does not include data on non-tax revenue and total government revenue, 
which are located in the Government Operations dataset. As with the OECD data, this can 
result in minor data discrepancies, and large discrepancies in a small number of cases, and 
must therefore be approached with caution.  
 
Figure A2.5 Structure of tax classification for CEPALSTAT 
  	  
A2.5 OECD/CEPAL/CIAT Revenue Statistics in Latin America database 
 
Since 2012 the OECD, CEPAL and CIAT have collaborated on the production of the 
Revenue Statistics in Latin America database. In broad terms, the initiative draws on data 
from CEPAL and its member countries in order to construct a new dataset that follows the 
OECD revenue classification system, with the goal of increasing international comparability. 
The Revenue Statistics in Latin America database generally conforms closely to the data 
contained in the CEPAL dataset. However, differences of classification occasionally result in 
sizeable differences across the two data sources, thus necessitating care in comparing or 
merging CEPAL data with data from the Revenue Statistics in Latin America database.40 As 
with the OECD Revenue Statistics, the Revenue Statistics in Latin America database does 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40  One example that is illustrative of the somewhat unpredictable nature of these classification differences relates to the 
recording of hydrocarbon revenue in Mexico, which is treated as tax revenue in the Revenue Statistics in Latin America 
database, but as non-tax revenue by CEPALSTAT.  
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not contain data for total government revenue, which can instead be taken from the 
CEPALSTAT database. Again, significant care is required in doing so, owing to the potential 
for discrepancies between the two sources. Finally, as with the OECD dataset, taxes on 
goods and services, and taxes on international trade, are aggregated into a single category, 
which can be approximately disaggregated into its component parts in order to match the 
IMF classification. Ultimately, owing to its greater comparability with other international 
sources the Revenue Statistics in Latin America dataset has generally been given preference 
over the CEPAL dataset in the construction of the ICTD dataset.  
 
A2.6 OECD/AfDB African Economic Outlook African Fiscal Performance 
 
Somewhat similar to the Revenue Statistics in Latin America database, the African Economic 
Outlook African Fiscal Performance has involved collaboration between the OECD and the 
African Development Bank to develop a more complete regional source of tax data. The 
dataset achieves a high level of data coverage, but the range of variables is limited (Figure 
A2.6), while the time period is limited to 1996-2010. In addition, updating of the data has 
been somewhat sporadic, documentation of sources incomplete and interfaces for using the 
data limited, all of which impose modest additional limitations on the use of the data. Notably, 
the most recent iteration of the dataset includes estimates by country of the level of resource 
rents, though this data is difficult to use owing to a lack of clarity about the underlying 
sources and methods for estimating the level of rents, and poor integration between the 
resource revenue figures and the separate reporting of aggregate tax and revenue 
categories. 
 
Figure A2.6 Structure of tax classification for the AEO African Fiscal Performance 
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A2.7 Existing research datasets 
 
Alongside these international databases we have also consulted three well-known datasets 
developed by researchers. 	  
A2.7.1 Keen and Mansour (IMF) 
 
The most widely cited researcher dataset is that developed by Mick Keen and Mario 
Mansour (2009) from the IMF. That dataset has recently been updated (Mansour 2014), 
though the updated data is not included in the ICTD GRD. The dataset draws data from IMF 
Article IV reports and other country-level sources, only some of which were publicly available 
at the time. The focus of the dataset was twofold: to record tax revenue from natural 
resources more accurately, and to construct a data series for taxes on international trade that 
was consistently exclusive of sales taxes on imports. As a result, the dataset contains the 
most systematic effort to capture resource revenue, as well as a uniquely consistent trade 
tax data series, while the data is generally complete and accurate for the countries covered. 
However, the coverage of the dataset is limited to Africa, the range of variables included in 
the dataset is partial, and the construction of the variables is idiosyncratic to the particular 
goals of the study, making them sometimes difficult to compare to other sources and studies. 
As discussed below, the approach adopted by Keen and Mansour thus provides inspiration 
for the approach adopted here, but it proves generally difficult to combine data from Keen 
and Mansour directly with data from other sources. 
 
Figure A2.7 Structure of tax classification for Keen and Mansour (2009) 
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A2.7.2 World Tax Database from the University of Michigan Ross School of Business	  	  
 
The University of Michigan ran a project with backing from the Ford Foundation and the 
Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation, to gather tax data from seventy countries around the 
world for the period 1970-1999. Data coverage for these countries and years is 
comparatively extensive, with a high degree of disaggregation. However, limited information 
is available about the sources and methodology used to build the database, beyond 
evidence that much of the data is derived from IMF and World Bank sources. As importantly, 
there appear to be important differences of classification relative to other sources, with the 
Michigan data frequently somewhat divergent from alternative international sources, thus 
reducing comparability. As a result, while data from the Michigan dataset has been included 
in comparative datasets underlying the ICTD GRD, the data has not been employed in the 
final researchers’ datasets. The experience of this initiative also speaks indirectly to the 
challenges associated with maintaining research databases that adopt definitions of 
categories that are not fully congruent with the most prominent international data sources. 
 
Figure A2.8 Structure of tax classification for the Michigan WTD 
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A2.7.3 Oxford Latin American Economic History Database (OxLAD) 
 
A final researcher dataset is the Oxford Latin American Economic History Database, which 
contains data for a limited number of tax variables covering the entire period 1900-1999. 
While impressive in its historical ambition, a lack of clarity about definitions and classification, 
the limited number of variables, and the curtailing of the dataset after 1999 present 
irreconcilable barriers to including the data in the final ICTD dataset. 
 
Figure A2.9 Structure of tax classification for OxLAD	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Appendix 3 Revenue trends over time 
 
Figure A3.1 Total tax collection by income group 1990-2009 
 
Notes: OECD High income includes all OECD countries excluding Mexico, Poland and Israel. Non-OECD high income includes 
Uruguay, Qatar, Aruba, Croatia, Lithuania, Brunei Darussalam, Malta, Trinidad and Tobago, Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, 
Singapore, Cyprus, Kuwait, Equatorial Guinea, Hong Kong, St Kitts and Nevis, San Marino, the Bahamas and Bahrain. Low-
income, lower middle-income and upper middle-income countries as detailed in figures for individual income groups below.  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.2 Total tax collection by region 1990-2009 
 
Notes: OECD includes all OECD countries excluding Mexico, Poland and Israel. Countries for regional groups as detailed in 
figures below.  
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure A3.3 Revenue composition for low-income countries 1990-2009 
 
Notes: Includes Tajikistan, Malawi, Uganda, Togo, Madagascar, Burkina Faso, Zimbabwe, Nepal, the Gambia, Tanzania, 
Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Rwanda, Haiti, Burundi, Ethiopia, Comoros, Guinea, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Benin, 
Chad, Democratic Republic of the Congo and Kyrgyz Republic. Liberia, Eritrea, Somalia, Afghanistan and Cambodia are 
excluded owing to inconsistent data coverage. Analysis excludes 2010 because Haiti and Ethiopia drop out of the sample, 
causing a spurious upward trend. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.4 Revenue composition for lower middle-income countries 1990-2009 
 
Notes: Includes Nigeria, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu, Paraguay, Lesotho, Yemen, Micronesia, Cape Verde, Bolivia, Honduras (no 
direct or indirect), Ghana, Guatemala, Nicaragua, Samoa, Philippines, Indonesia (no direct or indirect), Bhutan, Mauritania, 
Swaziland, Rep. Congo, Vietnam, Syria, Egypt, El Salvador, Sao Tome and Principe, Kiribati, Cameroon, Laos, Georgia, 
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, India, Cote D’Ivoire, Sudan, Senegal, Sri Lanka, Djibouti and Ukraine. Armenia, Uzbekistan, 
Kosovo, Timor-Leste, Zambia and Guyana are excluded owing to inconsistent data coverage. Analysis for 2010 is excluded as 
resource-producing countries disproportionately drop out of the sample due to missing data. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure A3.5 Revenue composition for upper middle-income countries 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Colombia, Fiji, Jamaica, Panama, Brazil, Malaysia, Venezuela, Palau, Tunisia, Algeria, Grenada, St. Lucia, 
Costa Rica, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Iran, Gabon, China (no direct or indirect), Maldives, Belize, Angola, Marshal Islands, 
Lebanon, Mauritius, Turkey, Cuba, Namibia, Argentina, Seychelles, Libya (no direct or indirect), Jordan, Thailand, St. Vincent 
and the Grenadines, Albania, Ecuador, Hungary, Botswana, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Romania and Macedonia. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Iraq, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Montenegro, Kazakhstan and Serbia are excluded owing to inconsistent data 
coverage. Analysis for 2010 is excluded as resource-producing countries disproportionately drop out of the sample due to 
missing data. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.6 Revenue composition for all developing countries 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Nigeria, Colombia (no direct or indirect), Fiji, Solomon Islands, Nepal, Zimbabwe, Jamaica, Malawi, Tanzania, 
Panama, Brazil, Vanuatu, Paraguay, Malaysia, Lesotho, Yemen, Micronesia (no direct or indirect), Venezuela, Cape Verde, 
Burkina Faso, Palau, Comoros, Rwanda, Tunisia, Algeria, Grenada, Bolivia, Kenya, Honduras (no direct or indirect), Togo, St. 
Lucia, Costa Rica, Belarus, Ghana, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan (no direct or indirect), Guatemala, Bulgaria, Nicaragua, Iran, Uganda, 
Burundi, Mozambique, Samoa, Madagascar, Gabon, Philippines, Indonesia (no direct or indirect), China, Guinea-Bissau, 
Bhutan, Mauritania, Dem. Rep. Congo, Maldives, Belize, Angola, Marshall Islands, Swaziland, Rep. Congo, Vietnam, Lebanon, 
Bangladesh, Mauritius, Turkey, Cuba, Gambia, Namibia, Argentina, Syria, Egypt, Seychelles, Libya, Benin, El Salvador, Sao 
Tome and Principe, Jordan, Haiti, Kiribati (no direct or indirect), Thailand, Cameroon, Georgia, St Vincent and Grenadines, 
Pakistan, Niger, Albania, Papua New Guinea, Chad, India, Cote D’Ivoire, Ecuador, Sudan, Guinea, Senegal, Hungary, 
Botswana, Mexico, Dominican Republic, Sri Lanka, Sierra Leone, Djibouti, Ukraine, Ethiopia, Romania and Macedonia. 
Kazakhstan, Moldova, Serbia, Armenia, Kyrgyz Republic, Eritrea, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Uzbekistan, Kosovo, 
Cambodia, Timor-Leste, Iraq, Montenegro, Zambia, Liberia, Korea Dem. Rep, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Guyana and Somalia are 
excluded owing to inconsistent data coverage. Analysis for 2010 is excluded as resource-producing countries disproportionately 
drop out of the sample due to missing data. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure A3.7 Composition of direct tax revenue for developing countries 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Philippines, Belarus, Turkey, Guatemala, Iran, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe, St Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Jamaica, Albania, the Gambia, Namibia, Brazil, Mauritius, Nigeria, Dem. Rep. Congo, Dominican Republic, Benin, 
Sri Lanka, Guinea-Bissau, Maldives, Hungary, Panama, Romania, Paraguay, Swaziland, Seychelles, Egypt, Bhutan, Cuba, 
Ukraine, Bolivia, Argentina, Costa Rica and Lesotho. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.8 Composition of indirect tax revenue for developing countries 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Solomon Islands, Philippines, Belarus, Vanuatu, Rep. Congo, Turkey, Mozambique, Ghana, Guatemala, 
Gabon, Iran, Jordan, Papua New Guinea, Zimbabwe, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, Jamaica, El Salvador, Botswana, 
Grenada, Thailand, Albania, Haiti, the Gambia, Namibia, Brazil, Brazil, Mauritius, Nigeria, Dem. Rep. Congo, Algeria, Dominican 
Republic, Benin, Mauritania, Cameroon, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Tanzania, Venezuela, 
Maldives, Guinea, Hungary, Panama, St. Lucia, Romania, Burkina Faso, Paraguay, Cape Verde, Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Chad, 
Seychelles, Nepal, Egypt, Burundi, Tunisia, Nicaragua, Rwanda, Ecuador, Lebanon, Bhutan, Cuba, Belize, Ukraine, Bolivia, 
Argentina, Costa Rica, Mexico and Lesotho. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure A3.9 Revenue composition in Sub-Saharan Africa 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Tanzania, Rwanda, Madagascar, Cape Verde, Cote D’Ivoire, Namibia, Angola, Central African Republic, 
Lesotho, Niger, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Ethiopia, Malawi, Cameroon, Nigeria, Mauritania, Botswana, Benin, Burundi, 
Swaziland, Ghana, Zimbabwe, Togo, Mauritius, Comoros, Gabon, Republic of Congo, Burkina Faso, Uganda, Sudan, Chad, the 
Gambia, South Africa, Mali, Sierra Leone, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Kenya and Guinea. Liberia, Zambia and Eritrea 
are excluded owing to inconsistent data coverage. Analysis excludes 2010 because the loss of Nigeria, Angola and Gabon from 
the sample leads to a spurious fall in non-tax revenue. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.10 Revenue composition in South Asia 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Afghanistan is excluded owing to 
inconsistent data coverage. Data for 2010 is excluded because the loss of Bhutan from the small sample of countries causes a 
marked downturn in non-tax revenue and upturn in tax revenue. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure A3.11 Revenue composition in East and South-East Asia 1990-2009 
 
Note: Includes Myanmar, Laos, Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, China, Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands and 
Philippines. Cambodia is excluded because of inconsistent data coverage, while we also exclude Pacific islands with 
populations below 200,000 (Tuvalu, Palau, Tonga, Samoa, Marshall Islands and Kiribati) as they otherwise dominate the 
sample. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.12 Revenue composition in the Middle East and North Africa 1990-2009 
	    
Notes: Includes Yemen, Morocco, Iran, Lebanon, Djibouti, Algeria, Syria, Libya, Jordan, Tunisia and Egypt. Iraq is excluded 
owing to inconsistent data coverage and problems excluding resource revenue. The smaller oil states in the Gulf (Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE and Qatar) are classified as a separate region by the World Bank. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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Figure A3.13 Revenue composition in Latin America 1990-2009 
	    
Note: Includes Argentina, Belize, Uruguay, Honduras, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Colombia (no direct and indirect), Chile, 
Bolivia, Guatemala, Venezuela, Brazil, Haiti, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Cuba, Paraguay, Costa Rica and Panama. Peru is 
excluded due to an inability to exclude resource revenue effectively, and Guyana is excluded owing to inconsistent data 
coverage. Time series for 2010 is excluded owing to a sharp decline in the availability of data for direct and indirect taxes 
because of a shift in available data sources at the time of compilation. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
 
Figure A3.14 Revenue composition in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 1990-2009 
 
Note: Includes Belarus, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Montenegro, Ukraine, Turkey, Bulgaria, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
Moldova, Slovak Republic, Serbia, Lithuania, Romania, Armenia, Macedonia, Latvia, Georgia, and Kyrgyz Republic (excluding 
direct and indirect). Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kosovo, Kazakhstan and Russia are excluded due to inconsistent data 
coverage. Analysis begins after 1996 owing to very incomplete data coverage in earlier years. 
Source: ICTD GRD (2014). 
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